Fort Funston Forum       Friday, October 6, 2000
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see Section One for News on the re-opening of the closed areas!

COURT REPORT
This section includes briefs and rulings in the federal case.


JUDGE RULES: OPEN CLOSURE AREAS IN AUGUST!

*****

SUMMARY of MAY 16 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION:

        The very favorable Preliminary Injunction ruling from Judge Alsup: Upon the end of the "emergency" [when the bank swallows leave] defendants are ordered (1) to leave the gates open in the seasonal area, and (2) install gates to the permanent closure area so as to allow access to the gap and the beach via the gap. Otherwise, the fences may remain in place with the gates open pending final judgment. The Park Service may apply to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction at such time as the Park Service complies with the 36 CFR 1.5 public notice and comment requirement. The Judge expressed the further comment that if the Park Service did not go through the rulemaking process of public notice and comment, "the Court may not be sympathetic to a future closure based on an "emergency" when the bank swallows return in April 2001, given that their return is foreseeable and sufficient lead time seems to exist for the National Park Service to address any problems through non-emergency means."


FULL TEXT OF MAY 16 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION:

FILED: MAY 16 2000 4:23 PM

 

                                                                      

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

No. C 00-00877 WHA

 

FT. FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, a

membership organization; SFDOG, a California

limited partnership; LINDA MCKAY, an

individual; FLORENCE SARRETT, an

individual; LINDSAY KEFAUVER; an

individual; and MARION CARDINAL, an

individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;

ROBERT STANTON, Director of the National

Park Service; JOHN REYNOLDS, Regional

Director, Pacific West Region, National Park

Service; and BRIAN O'NEILL, General

Superintendent of the Golden Gate National

Recreation Area,

 

Defendants.

____________________________________/

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY,

Intervener/Defendant.

____________________________________/

 

       Based on the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law dated April 23, 2000, the Court enters the following preliminary injunction against defendants:

       Effective upon the end of the pending emergency (declared by the National Park Service upon the April return of the bank swallows), defendants are ordered to leave the gate open to the new temporary closure at Fort Funston and, with respect to the new permanent closure, to have installed such gates and leave them open as necessary to allow access to the gap and to the beach via the gap. Otherwise, the fences may remain in place pending a final judgment.

       If and when the National Park Service fully complies with the regulation requiring notice and comment, 36 C.F.R. 1.5(b), the National Park Service may apply for the Court to modify and/or dissolve this preliminary injunction. If the National Park Service does not do so, the Court may not be sympathetic to a future closure based on an "emergency" when the bank swallows return in April 2001, given that their return is foreseeable and sufficient lead time seems to exist for the National Park Service to address any problems through non-emergency means.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2000.

[Signed]

WILLIAM ALSUP                             

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


[ from Thursday, May 11, 2000 ]

EDITORIAL:  The Golden Gate Audubon Society's remedy reply brief, below, seems at pains to retract any implication from earlier statements that a fence along the cliffs would be acceptable. And, although it does not claim that there is any nesting activity along the seasonal closure cliffs now,  it states that this could  occur until mid-May.  But when's mid-May... within the next week ! It seems unlikely by now that burrows will appear beneath the seasonal closure area, making its closure on an emergency basis without publication or comment questionable, perhaps even "arbitrary and capricious."

Yet, in a telling section, the brief states: "At any future hearing challenging the emergency closure, plaintiffs would have to challenge the expert opinion of the Park Service, the California Department of Fish and Game, and intervenor's [Audubon's] experts." The implication and threat is that, regardless of whether there is any nesting activity in the seasonal area, experts' support for the "emergency" closure has already been lined up. This is reminiscent of the e-mail from last October in which a Park Service employee wrote a Fish and Game expert, trying to specify the wording of what the expert should say in his report: that the decline in the bank swallows was due to "recreational impacts."

The simple observation that there don't seem to be nesting bank swallows in the seasonal area (from the dogwalkers' remedy brief) brought about a howl of protest from both the government and Audubon in their replies: "irrelevant, incompetent, speculative, and should be stricken," said the government, while Audubon hurled charges such as, "presumptuous", "irresponsible", "bold", and "hubris"! Perhaps they are speaking of only procedural issues, but it does seem they doth protest too much the fact that non-experts can readily see that there isn't, there wasn't, and in the next week there likely ain't gonna be the need for the emergency closure which U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup on April 14th declared "a complete end-run around this lawsuit."

                                                                                                            - Michael B. Goldstein, Editor  


Fort Funston Forum is an independent publication. The opinions expressed are those of the editor and identified writers, and are specifically not presented here as the opinions of any other person or organization involved with current issues at Fort Funston.   - Michael B. Goldstein, Editor


GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY'S REMEDY REPLY BRIEF

May 9, 2000

in reply to the dogwalkers' remedy brief filed on May 4th (also below).


TO PRINT: Click here for a standalone version of just the brief.


CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT
LAURENS H. SILVER, Esq. # 55339
302 Sycamore Street
Mill Valley, CA 94941
Tel: (415) 383-5688 Fax: (415) 383-7995
 

KELLY L. DRUMM, Esq. # 172767
1168 Dolores Street
San Francisco, CA 94110<
Tel: (415) 826-9067 Fax: (415) 826-9421

Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor
Golden Gate Audubon Society

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

C 000877 WHA

 

FORT FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, an
Unincorporated Membership Organization;
SF DOG, a California
limited Partnership, LINDA MCKAY an Individual; FLORENCE SARRETT, An Individual; LINDSAY KEFAUVER, an Individual; and MARION CARDINAL, an Individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT
GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON
SOCIETY'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM RE:
PROVISIONAL REMEDY
PENDING DETERMINATION
ON THE MERITS

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;
ROBERT STANTON, Director of the National
Park Service; JOHN REYNOLDS, Regional
Director, Pacific West Region, National Park
Service; and BRIAN O'NEILL, General
Superintendent of the Golden Gate National
Recreation Area,

 

        

 

 

 

 

 

                 Defendants.

Hearing Date:

Courtroom 9

Hon. Judge Alsup

 

 

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY, a
California Non-profit Membership Organization,

 

Intervenor/Defendant.

 

        Intervenor/Defendant Golden Gate Audubon Society sharply takes issue with plaintiffs' request for provisional relief. Plaintiffs totally ignore this Court's statement in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Probability of Success and Irreparable Injury, filed April 25, 2000, that:

"Because the National Park Service has declared an emergency upon the recent arrival of the bank swallows, no injunction will become effective until August upon their annual departure or until further proceedings and determination as to the validity of its emergency declaration or its scope."

        Plaintiffs seek instead immediate reopening of the closed areas to off-leash dog walking, and as well, removal of the fences and any other barriers to entry to the areas subject to the Park Service's emergency closure. Submitting a declaration that the Bank Swallows, who have just recently arrived, have not nested further south than they did last year, plaintiffs de facto attack the necessity and validity of the emergency closure.

        Plaintiffs have not amended their complaint, and this Court has held no hearing at which defendants or intervenors have had an opportunity to justify and defend the emergency closure. Certainly, even if plaintiffs had put on competent evidence and stated a claim asking the Court to review the closure under the arbitrary and capricious standard, they would have a heavy burden to bear in view of the fact that the emergency closure is to protect a state-listed threatened species.

        In City of Las Vegas vs. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1989) the Court held the Secretary of Interior's emergency listing of the Mojave Desert population of desert tortoise due to upper respiratory infection was owed substantial deference. Emergency actions to protect endangered species and/or their habitat "contemplate a somewhat less rigorous process of investigation and explanation," Id, 891 F.2d at 392. The Court held, with respect to the emergency powers of the Secretary under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.§ 1533, that "whatever quantum of data the Secretary must possess to issue an emergency regulation, it need not rise to the level of 'substantial evidence' - or at least that the Secretary would not inquire as thoroughly at the emergency listing stage." Id. The Court specifically endorsed the power of the Secretary, through an emergency listing, to act "prophylactically" ("...the danger of the epidemic spreading to Nevada is sufficient justification for including Nevada's tortoises in the emergency listing, he need not wait until the epidemic crosses the California-Nevada border.") Id., at 933.

       The. Park Service's emergency closure to protect Bank Swallows at Fort Funston was made by memorandum dated April 12, 2000. That memorandum recites that:

"Bank swallows have been nesting at Ft. Funston since at least 1972 [ The emergency closure memorandum actually said "at least since 1927" rather than 1972 - Editor, Fort Funston Forum.] and typically arrive in late March or early April. On April 11, 2000, bank swallows were observed in the vicinity of the seasonal closure area. In consultation with the California Department of Fish and Game and the Audubon Society (attached hereto), and based upon the NPS guidance requiring protection of special status species (NPS Management Policies, Chapter 4, and NPS-77) and the determination contained in the March 3, 2000 memorandum, the park has determined that an emergency situation exists that requires closure of the seasonal closure area at Ft. Funston in order to protect the habitat of the state threatened bank swallow. Accordingly, the seasonal area was gated and closed to public access on April 12, 2000, at approximately 9:00 a.m."

        Given the bold sweep and hubris of plaintiffs' claims for preliminary injunctive relief, intervenors attach the declaration of Dan Murphy, who has recently visited the nesting site. The declaration concludes that the swallows are currently still seeking out nesting sites, and it is too early to make any conclusions concerning nesting range for this year. It is presumptuous and irresponsible for plaintiffs to be seeking relief with respect to a claim not in issue before the court -- the validity of the emergency closure. Intervenor Golden Gate Audubon Society believes that given this Court's April 25, 2000, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Probability of Success and Irreparable Injury, quoted above, this Court should not consider any relief that would result in any change or alteration of the emergency closure.

        At any future hearing challenging the emergency closure, plaintiffs would have to challenge the expert opinion of the Park Service, the California Department of Fish and Game, and intervenor's experts. As pointed out in the Declaration of Dan Murphy, filed concurrently with this brief, neither at the site visit, nor at any other time, has Golden Gate Audubon Society agreed that a fence thirty-feet from the bluff edge would be sufficient to protect bank swallows for all purposes. See Declaration of Dan Murphy re: Site Visit at Ft Funston, ¶¶9-10. Though such a fence might be helpful in reducing disturbances impinging on nesting activities on the cliff face below, it would not be adequate to protect against erosion or to protect the Bank Swallows engaging in nest-foraging activities on top of the cliffs. See Declaration of Dan Murphy re: Site Visit at Ft. Funston, ¶¶9-10. In any event, under applicable law, the Park Service is entitled to, in the context of an emergency closure, to act prophylactically to abate any potential at adverse effects to the colony with respect to nesting. It need not choose the minimum degree of protection. It may, as it has done, relying on the opinions of its experts, the California Department of Fish and Game and Audubon, provide more than the minimal amount of protection. Plaintiffs have produced no experts and have only advanced "testimony" of their attorneys who are profligate with opinions, advanced in the interest of their clients, about what is adequate protection for the swallows in light of the desire of their clients to resume off-leash dog walking in the area.

        As pointed out in intervenor's opening brief on this issue, as a matter of law and application of equitable principles, plaintiffs are at best, eligible for only preliminary declaratory relief. If this Court issues any injunctive relief pending Park Service rule-making on closures, it has a legal obligation to limit public access to the area only to such activities as are lawful under current regulations applicable to Fort Funston. Under such regulations, only walking dogs on leash on designated roads or trails is permitted. See 36 C.F.R. 2.15. Therefore, any injunction allowing interim access to the closed areas after August should limit use of the area to on-leash dog walking in designated, signed roads and trails.

 

Dated. May 9, 2000

Respectfully submitted,

CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
PROJECT

By:         

Laurens H. Silver
Kelly L. Drumm  [Signed]

 

 


CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT
LAURENS H. SILVER, Esq. # 55339
302 Sycamore Street
Mill Valley, CA 94941
Tel: (415) 383-5688 Fax: (415) 383-7995
 

KELLY L. DRUMM, Esq. # 172767
1168 Dolores Street
San Francisco, CA 94110<
Tel: (415) 826-9067 Fax: (415) 826-9421

Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor
Golden Gate Audubon Society

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

C 000877 WHA

 

FORT FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, an
Unincorporated Membership Organization;
SF DOG, a California
limited Partnership, LINDA MCKAY an Individual; FLORENCE SARRETT, An Individual; LINDSAY KEFAUVER, an Individual; and MARION CARDINAL, an Individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

DECLARATION OF
DAN MURPHY RE: SITE
VISIT AT FORT FUNSTON
IN SUPPORT OF AUDUBON
SOCIETY'S MEMORANDUM
RE: PROVISIONAL REMEDY

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;
ROBERT STANTON, Director of the National
Park Service; JOHN REYNOLDS, Regional
Director, Pacific West Region, National Park
Service; and BRIAN O'NEILL, General
Superintendent of the Golden Gate National
Recreation Area,

 

         Defendants.

 

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY, a
California Non-profit Membership Organization,

 

Intervenor/Defendant.

Hearing Date: None set

Courtroom 9

Hon. Judge Alsup

 

 

 

 

 


         I, Daniel P, Murphy, under penalty of perjury do hereby declare:


        1.        I am a former Board member, past president and am presently a member of the conservation committee for the Golden Gate Audubon Society, and am authorized to make this declaration on its behalf. I am also a field trip leader for Golden Gate Audubon and have led trips to Fort Funston to observe the Bank Swallow Colony, as well as other bird species. I am also an experienced birder, conservationist and environmental educator with extensive experience leading bird-watching fieldtrips, and have published numerous papers on the topic of birding. See Addendum, attached to Declaration of D. Motion in Support of Ex Parte Application of Golden Gate Audubon to Intervene.

        2.        On May 8, 2000 between approximately 5:00 6:05 p.m. I made a site visit to Ft. Funston for the purpose of observing the Bank Swallows. During my visit I filled out a "Bank Swallow Daily Summary Sheet," which is provided by the Park Service for purposes of monitoring Bank Swallow activity during nesting season. See Exhibit A, attached hereto, for a
copy of the Park Service's 'Bank Swallow Daily Summary Sheet " See also USO4855 and PEB154 for a filled out copy of the Summary Sheet from 6/2/1996.

        3.        The Bank Swallow Daily Summary Sheet identifies four separate areas for purposes of identifying Bank Swallow burrows. Area 1 is identified as extending from the "North End to the Gap," the "North End" being the area by the parking lot at the north end of the park (approximately west of the Wastewater Treatment Plant and north of the area previously closed by the Park Service in 1995 for swallow protection) and the "Gap" as being the area in between the previously closed (1995) swallow protection area and the new (year 2000) permanent closure area. Area 2 is identified as extending from the "Gap to Gunmount" with the "Gunmount" being the gunmount which has fallen off of the edge of the bluff top and
located immediately below the permanent closure area and north of the seasonal closure area. Area 3 is identified as extending from the "Gunmount to Panama Point."  "Panama Point" is almost directly below the boundary between the permanent closure area and the seasonal closure area. Lastly, Area 4 is identified as extending from "Panama Point to the Beach Access." The "Beach Access" is the Park Service designated trail that leads to the beach from the bluff top and runs approximately west of the "Y" in the Battery Davis trail. The Beach Access is south of the seasonal closure area.
        

        4.        During my site visit I observed a total of 80 burrows, 59 of which appeared active (i.e., evidence of excrement or signs of new digging activity) in Area 2 (Gap to Gunmount). I observed Bank Swallows nesting within or performing nesting activities around 28 of the burrows. These 80 burrows are located at approximately the same site as last year's burrows (those of which survived the winter storms) and have extended slightly northward. Last season's nesting site extended from an area south of the Gap to an area slightly north of the Gunmount.

        5.        In addition, I observed a new nesting site further south of the above-described location of the 80 burrows, which appears to be forming directly above the Gunmount, just north of the seasonal closure area. I observed 2 burrows at this new location, in one of which I observed a pair of nesting Bank Swallows.

        6.        I also observed at least 5 Bank Swallows flying over Panama Point and appeared to be collecting nesting material.

        7.        I observed Bank Swallows digging two new burrows today, which in my experience means that the Bank Swallows are still continuing to arrive. Based upon my experience, Bank Swallows will continue to arrive at Ft. Funston until mid-May, and as such, the extent to which the nesting activity will extend further south -- towards and possibly into the seasonal closure area -- is not yet known.

        8.        I also observed for the first time in my experience of viewing Bank Swallows at Ft. Funston, Bank Swallows collecting dead roots from the top of the bluffs above the permanent closure area, an activity different from the Bank Swallow's usual practice of collecting nesting materials from the beach.

        9.        While it is true that I stated at this Court's site visit to Ft. Funston that a fence 30-feet away from the cliff edge would protect the nesting Bank Swallows, I qualified that statement by stating that it was unknown whether and to what extent the Bank Swallows derived additional benefit from having the buffer area presently provided by the Park Service in the seasonal and permanent closure areas. In light of the new activity I observed during my site visit (described in ¶9), I believe the permanent closure area should remain closed for use by plaintiffs and the general public. This is because any new disturbances in the permanent closure area, either by dogs or people, may discourage the continued and expanded use of the permanent closure area for nest building purposes by the Bank Swallows.

        10.        It is also my opinion that all of the seasonal and permanent closure area should remain closed to public use in order to prevent further bluff erosion so as to ensure the existence habitat for the Bank Swallows in the future. I in no way intended for my statement made at the Court's site visit to Ft. Funston that Bank Swallows would be protected by the implementation of a fence 30-feet back from the edge of the bluffs to indicate that I did not support the Park Service's decision to close the seasonal and permanent closure areas to public use and off-leash dog walking. Both I and Golden Gate Audubon Society continue to support the Park Service's closure decision.

        I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 9th day of May, 2000, in the city and county of San Francisco, California.







GOVERNMENT'S REMEDY REPLY BRIEF

May 9, 2000


TO PRINT: Click here for a standalone version of just the brief.


Note: Converting an analog document to digital, and then on to the Web is a considerable task, particularly if one is concerned about reproducing the document precisely as it was filed in federal court. This brief appears to have a dozen errors as filed. These involve spelling, grammar, missing or extra words, etc. It is not the intent of this website to highlight others' errors. On the other hand, if these errors were left un-noted, the reader might well have the impression that they were the result of a hasty publication and the lack of adequate comparison to the original (which is available for public review at the U.S. District Court, Federal Building, San Francisco.) For that reason, these perceived errors are shown in red font color here.


ROBERT S. MUELLER, III (SBN 59775)
United States Attorney
CHARLES M. O'CONNOR (SBN 56320)
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Environment & Natural Resources Unit

     450 Golden Gate Avenue - P.O. Box 36055
     San Francisco, California 94102
     Telephone (415) 436-7180
     Facsimile (415) 436-6748

 Attorneys for Defendant

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

C 00 0877 WHA

 

FORT FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, a membership organization; SF DOG, a California limited partnership; Linda McKay, an individual; Florence Sarrett,an individual; Lindsay Kefauver, an individual; and Marion Cardinal, an individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

DEFENDANTS' REPLY BRIEF

ON THE ISSUE OF REMEDY

 

 

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;
Robert Stanton, Director of the National Park
Service; John Reynolds, Regional Director,
Pacific West Region, National Park Service; and
Brian O'Neill, General Superintendent of the
Golden Gate National Recreation Area,

 

         Defendants.

 

INTRODUCTION


     This brief is filed in reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum Re: Provisional Remedy Pending Determination on the Merits ("P Memo"). Pending a determination on the merits, the remedy sought by plaintiffs is apparently "nothing short of removing all the recently installed fences." P Memo, at 7:10-13. However, plaintiffs allow that a temporary sort of "remedy which allows plaintiffs to use the land without removal of the fences may be appropriate," but they do not select or endorse a particular method to accomplish that objective. Id. at 7:14-15. To fully confuse their position, plaintiffs also "urge the Park Service to install appropriate fences or employ other measures to assure protection of the bank swallows if the fences are removed.." Id. at 7:13-14.

     Defendants have already completed their plan "to install the appropriate fences... to assure protection of the bank swallows," including protection of their habitat, by slowing erosion and restoring the native plants. In addition, the fences protect public safety, e.g., prevention of dogs and their owners falling from the cliffs. In the course of defendants' planning, they modified the project by changing the location of the fences and altering the annual time of closure for about half of the area from permanent to seasonal, to accommodate plaintiffs' interests. Having done what was necessary for the park, with modifications in response to the plaintiffs' objections, the defendants were sued by plaintiffs, and they are now urging the Court to order that the fences that protect the swallows and other resources be removed. In view of the forgoing, and inasmuch as the Park Service is the agency charged with the protection of the resources of the park, the Court should not at this preliminary stage of the case try to invent a new remedy that involves movement and/or removal of the current fences. Moreover, in this review of agency administrative action, the Court can order remand to the Park Service for compliance with any perceived procedural defects, but it cannot and should not order a particular action by defendants, such as removal of the fence or modification of its location. Finally, this matter is before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs as a remedy at this stage of the case goes far beyond preliminary relief and seeks the type of relief this Court should consider only when considering the merits a permanent injunction. Therefore, the Court should deny the preliminary injunctive relief described in and sought by the Plaintiffs' Memorandum.

ARGUMENT

     Plaintiffs contend that the status quo here is to "return" the closed area in question to its condition prior to the closure. Plaintiffs are mistaken. The status quo in this case was the condition of the property, including the fences, at the time the Complaint was filed, not the time prior to the installation of the fences At the time of the hearing on the motion for TRO, the perimeter fence surrounding newly closed area was already complete. Recognizing that fact and the need for the fencing, the Court specifically authorized the defendants to complete the divisional fence between the seasonal and permanently closed portions. Therefore, based on these facts, none of the fences should be moved or removed as part of the Court's ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction. Movement or removal of the fences can be pursued on the merits by plaintiffs, but not at the preliminary injunctive stage.

     Plaintiffs' brief misses the mark as to the injunctive relief available at this preliminary stage of the proceedings. It also misconstrues and mis-characterizes the facts and the nature of the procedure to be applied to this administrative action and the Courts' review of same. As to the critical factual and legal points in their argument, plaintiffs fail to cite the record for facts and/or any legal authority for the legal propositions they urge upon the Court. First, plaintiffs' argument deals with only one of the bases for the defendants' decision to close the subject area of Fort Funston, i.e., protection of the bank swallow burrows and/or nesting areas. In fact the record discloses that there were several reasons for the closure including the protection of the bank swallows' habitat from erosion (caused by heavy human and pet activity), the re-vegetation of the area with native plants, and the safety of the visiting public. AR US06615-6618. None of plaintiffs' arguments or proposals for a remedy deal with all of the reasons for closure, and as a result, all of plaintiffs' proposals for the remedy are flawed and irrelevant to the facts and should be denied on that basis alone.

     Second, plaintiffs' Memorandum does not recognize or deal with the fact that an emergency closure of the seasonal area was declared by the Park Service on April 12, 2000, See Court's FF&CL, at 16:20-22. This emergency declaration and closure of the seasonal area is not subject to the plaintiffs' Complaint and not subject to or affected by the Court's FF&CL. Similarly, it is not subject to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and/or the remedy now being considered by the Court. Therefore, plaintiffs' argument that the preliminary injunction include removal of the gates in the fence on the seasonal area (plaintiffs' Memo at 2:23-24) and giving plaintiffs and their dogs immediate access to the seasonal area (Id., at 3:5-13) is without merit, and the preliminary injunction should not include any relief for plaintiffs as to the emergency closure of the seasonal area. This is consistent with the Court's FF&CL, i.e. "[b]ecause the National Park Service has declared an emergency upon the recent arrival of the bank swallows, no injunction will become effective until August upon their annual departure or until further proceedings and determination as to the validity of the emergency declaration or its scope." FF&CL 30:1-4 (emphasis added).

     Also, with regard to the seasonal area, plaintiffs' have submitted the Declaration of Michael Goldstein ("Goldstein") with photographs attached, as the basis for arguing that the seasonal area need not remain closed now because Goldstein has not found evidence of burrowing by the bank swallows in the cliffs of the seasonal area. The Goldstein Declaration should be rejected for several reasons, First, it is irrelevant because the closure of the seasonal area is not before the Court. Second, it is objectionable as an extra-record submission and should be rejected on the same grounds and reasons stated in Defendants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Filing of Extra-Record Material, filed 4/3/00. Third, Mr. Goldstein is not qualified as an expert who can both identify bank swallow burrows and state his opinion as to the meaning of his inspection of the area. For example, Mr. Goldstein did not and cannot purport to state that all burrows have been completed for the season at this time and that no additional burrows will be excavated in the seasonal area, this year. Accordingly, the Goldstein Declaration is irrelevant, incompetent, speculative, and should be stricken. Nevertheless, in the event the Court decide to consider it, plaintiffs are filing, this date, the Declaration of Terri L Thomas ("Thomas") which attaches a letter from the Golden Gate Audubon Society. It demonstrates the continuing need to keep the cliffs of the seasonal area and others protected and available to the bank swallows for nesting this and every season to come. If the Court does not consider the Goldstein Declaration, the defendants will withdraw the Thomas Declaration.

     Plaintiffs address the issue of the notice and comment requirements of 36 CFR 1.5 by concluding, without supporting authority, that the defendants must follow the "rulemaking process" in Department of Interior Manual "318 DM" in order to close the subject areas at Ft. Funston. Having built this strawman argument, based on nothing but their own interpretation and without any authority, plaintiffs then proceed to knock it down, telling the Court that this process is too long for them to wait. Therefore, they say the Court should immediately order relief in the form of removal of the fences, etc. However, plaintiffs are mistaken in their conclusions and argument. In fact, notice and comment in relation to defendants actions under to 36 CFR 1.5, is not the formal rule making that plaintiffs set forth in their Memo.

     In connection with the promulgation of the final version of Section 1.5, the preamble published in the notice of the rule in the Federal Register explained that "published as rulemaking in the FEDERAL REGISTER" as used in 1.5 was intended to consist of a "notice and comment" process.

Public notice and comment is not intended to apply to measures taken to achieve routine resource management objectives, such as construction, facility maintenance or rehabilitation, and routine practices which are aimed at preserving the viability, integrity and natural character of the park ecosystem. 48 Fed. Reg. 30,252-30,261 (June 30, 1983)

     The notice and comment process for Section 1.5 consists of publishing a "Notice" in the Federal Register and giving the public 30 to 60 days to comment. Upon receiving the comments, the Park Service evaluates the coments thoroughly before making a decision on whether and how to proceed. To require notice and formal rule making for the kinds of decisions as those before this Court would unreasonably slow and hinder the Park Services' ability to close areas within a reasonable time after a threat to the resource is observed and potentially allow irreparable harm the resource while awaiting the processing of a formal rule. Requiring formal rulemaking would be unreasonable and unnecessary for that protective function. Therefore, the 30/60 day notice and comment, as outlined above, are the only requirements for closures under 36 CFR 1.5.

     It is noteworthy and baffling that plaintiffs' arguments for injunctive relief fail to show this Court a way it can possibly order removal or movement of the fencing, notwithstanding the prohibition of dogs off leash in 36 CFR 2.15. Plaintiffs may still believe, as they erroneously advised the Court, that the 1996 compendium for GGNRA is still in effect. As stated in defendants' open brief on remedy, the GGNRA local rule (aka, "amendment") that allowed off leash-voice command dog walking which appeared in the 1996 compendium was superceded and became inoperative when the 1997 compendium was signed. See attached copy of AR US00260-61, ¶ 2. Indeed, the Park Service lacks the authority to take any actions under Section 1.5 that are contrary to Servicewide regulatory standards, such as Section 2.15. The preamble to section 1.5 explains this restriction:

The designation process specified in this section gives the superintendent limited discretion in allowing activities within park areas provided they are not contrary to Federal statutory law or in derogation of park values. Designations that allow a relaxation from Servicewide regulatory restrictions are specifically provided for in the individual regulations in this chapter. The superintendent is not authorized to use § 1.5(a) to relax Service regulatory standards except where the authority is directly and specifically provided in a regulation. Superintendents may use the authority of § 1.5(a)(3) only to relax restrictions imposed at the park level under the authority of § 1.5 or another section providing authority to the superintendent. Section 1.5(a) may never be used to contravene Federal statutory law or the general regulations in this chapter, unless specifically provided for in a particular section.

Clearly, Section 2.15 provides the superintendent with no authority to relax the prohibition against dogs off leash at Ft. Funston, and no such authority supports plaintiffs' theory here.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have failed to show entitlement to the relief they seek in this case, and this Court should deny the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction.

 

DATED: May 9, 2000                                     

 

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III
United States Attorney

[Signed,]

CHARLES M. O'CONNOR
Assistant United States Attorney

 

 

 

 

OF COUNSEL:

 

Ralph Mihan, Field Solicitor
Nicole Walthall, Esq., PPO
U.S. Department of the Interior

 







DOGWALKERS' REMEDY REPLY BRIEF

May 9, 2000


Yesterday, the dogwalkers' reply to the remedy briefs of the government (representing the National Park Service) and the Golden Gate Audubon Society (which joined the case on the Park Service's side) was filed in U.S. District Court. The brief follows. The reply briefs of the two other parties will be published here soon.

Proposing a pre-existing closure? Regarding the government's suggestion as to how the Park Service would bring about a closure according to the law it so far seems to have sidestepped, the brief asks:

Defendants now take the position that the Park Service will publish the "proposed" closure in the Federal Register, take comments, and "evaluate the comments and then make a decision how it would proceed." Defendants' Brief, 9:10-12. The land already is closed. Are the defendants proposing taking the fences down, then publishing a "proposed" closure? Or, are they proposing leaving the fences in place, publishing a "preexisting" closure, then determining whether the "preexisting" closure should remain intact?

TO PRINT: Click here for a standalone version of just the brief.


PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO

DEFENDANTS' AND INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT'S

BRIEFS RE: REMEDY


 

LYDIA OWEN BOESCH (CA Bar No. 147901)

110 Maywood Drive

San Francisco, CA 94127-2040

Telephone: (415) 841-1060

Facsimile: (415) 841-0437

 

JOHN B. KEATING (CA Bar No. 148729)

2995 Woodside Road, Suite 350

Woodside, CA 94062

Telephone: (650) 851-5900

Facsimile: (650) 851-5912

 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

 

 

                                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

                                           NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

C-00-0877 WHA

 

FORT FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, a

membership organization; SFDOG, a

California limited partnership, Linda

McKay, an individual; Florence Sarrett, an individual; Lindsay Kefauver, an individual;

and Marion Cardinal, an individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO

DEFENDANTS' AND

INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT'S

BRIEFS RE: REMEDY

Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;

ROBERT Stanton, Director of the National

Park Service; John Reynolds, Regional

Director, Pacific West Region, National

Park Service; and Brian O'Neill, General

Superintendent of the Golden Gate National

Recreation Area,

 

Defendants.

____________________________________/

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY, a

California Nonprofit Membership

Organization,

 

Intervenor/Defendant.

Date: (None set)

Ctrm: Hon.William H. Alsup

 

 

 

 

          Plaintiffs submit this memorandum to reply to the briefs filed by defendants and intervenor/defendant addressing a provisional remedy in this case.

          The question at this stage is the procedure used by the Park Service to implement the ten-acre closure at Fort Funston. This was recognized early by this Court at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order. Twice, the Court stated that the question is whether the Park Service had jumped through the right hoops. Transcript of Proceedings, Mar. 14, 2000, 12:7-8, 80:19-20 (attached hereto as Exhibit A). Thus, the merits of the closure are not in issue. Accordingly, defendants' arguments regarding their reasons for the closure are not relevant in determining whether the Park Service followed the proper procedure, and the interim relief if they didn't. Moreover, the Court already has balanced the hardships. No further balancing is required at this stage.

          Defendants have made no showing that rulemaking can be conducted in a timely manner. To the contrary, at the TRO hearing, counsel for defendants admitted that the Federal Register pre-publication process is "laborious and time-consuming"

I think however to get to that point of publishing the rule in the Federal Register would have been a much more laborious and time-consuming affair . . . . [Transcript of Proceedings, Mar. 14, 2000, 17:1-3, attached as Exhibit B.]

Defendants now take the position that the Park Service will publish the "proposed" closure in the Federal Register, take comments, and "evaluate the comments and then make a decision how it would proceed." Defendants' Brief, 9:10-12. The land already is closed. Are the defendants proposing taking the fences down, then publishing a "proposed" closure? Or, are they proposing leaving the fences in place, publishing a "preexisting" closure, then determining whether the "preexisting" closure should remain intact?

          Defendants' first proposal (remove the fences then publish a "proposed" closure) is consistent with the requirements of 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(b). Publishing a "preexisting" closure, however, violates the regulatory scheme and deprives plaintiffs and the public of their use and enjoyment of this land during the long rulemaking process.

           No emergency precipitated the permanent closure. The "emergency" underpinning for the seasonal closure no longer supports closure of this area. If the closure of these two areas indeed is "highly controversial"-- and the record strongly demonstrates that it is -- or if a significant alteration of the public use pattern results, rulemaking is required, and the land should be reopened in the interim.

          Defendants' and intervenor/defendant's arguments regarding off-leash practices at Fort Funston also have no relevance in determining whether the Park Service followed the proper procedure before implementing the ten-acre closure. Plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of this land is precluded and the aesthetics of the park are affected regardless of whether dogs are on leash or off.

          In her deposition, plaintiff Marion Cardinal was asked if it bothers her that she no longer may walk her dog off leash in the closed area. She replied that what bothers her is that she can't use the closed land at all, regardless of the leash status of her dog:

What bothers me is that I'm not able to walk with or without a leash. I mean I can't walk there at all. [Deposition of Marion Cardinal, 38:22-24, attached as Exhibit C.]

          It does not matter whether plaintiffs walk their dogs on or off leash. What does matter is that, every single day, plaintiffs and the public (1) are deprived the use and enjoyment of this land, (2) are forced to look at a web of fences that are a blight to the land (as well as being daily reminders of the Park Service's probable malfeasance and the broken promises of the General Superintendent and Fort Funston's head ranger), and, (3) if they choose to walk on the beach, risk a hazard at high tide that results from the loss of a beach access route.

          Injunctive relief clearly is warranted under these circumstances. The new fences should be removed (with protective measures provided for the bank swallows), giving plaintiffs and the public full access to what just has been voted "The Best Place in the Bay Area to Walk a Dog" (see Exhibit D, attached).

 

Respectfully submitted,

 

__________________________________ LYDIA OWEN BOESCH

JOHN B. KEATING

 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Dated. May 9, 2000

 




May 8, 2000: The "seasonal closure area" is to the left. It was closed by emergency order of the National Park Service on April 12, 2000 at 9:00 a.m., allegedly due to the return of the bank swallows. However, the birds aren't nesting anywhere near even the distant cliffs of the seasonal  area. The signs announcing this closure do not cite the authority or regulation authorizing the closure, and cite the bank swallow as an "endangered species", when it is in fact a California state-threatened one.


 

May 8, 2000: Taken from the road, this photo shows the extent of the land grab by the National Park Service: everything in view is closed, yet the area where the bank swallows supposedly  need protection from activity on cliffs above them is in the far distance where the signs are.


[ from Monday, May 8, 2000 ]

Brief Week

The briefs are flying in the case of Fort Funston Dog Walkers et al v. Bruce Babbitt et al, over the issue of how the Fort Funston closures were handled. In referring to National Park Service communications unearthed through the case's discovery process, U.S. District Judge William Alsup in his order of April 26th, 2000, wrote:

"These excerpts show an intent on the part of the National Park Service to railroad through the closure, to maintain secrecy, to unleash the fencing with lightening speed, and to establish a fait accompli."

Judge Alsup ordered the parties (the dog walkers, the National Park Service represented by the U.S. Attorney's office, and the Golden Gate Audubon Society which joined the case early on as an intervenor/defendant siding with the Park Service) to present briefs addressing proposed remedies for his finding that there was a probability that the Park Service violated its own regulations by closing areas while apparently knowing far in advance that the closures would be "highly controversial". In such cases, the agency is required to conduct "rulemaking": a process designed to make sure that proposals are published in the Federal Register and the public is given a period of 60 days to comment before the agency makes a final decision and publishes that decision as well in the Federal Register.

The next step is for each side to file "reply briefs" in response, by tomorrow, Tuesday, May 9th. Look to this site for the latest news and court documents as the case moves forward this week.

Last Thursday, after the dog walkers' remedy brief was filed, it was published here (see below). Today the other two briefs are being published. These are, of course, public records filed in this ongoing federal case.

Note: these briefs have been very carefully examined word by word to make sure they are reproduced here exactly as filed. There are several apparent minor errors of various kinds in the original documents, which are not being corrected or pointed out as they occur.      - Editor


Follow these links to go to each document separately (they load faster and can be printed separately):

Government Remedy Brief

Audubon Remedy Brief

Dogwalkers' Remedy Brief

or view the same documents one after the other below, as well as earlier court filings.


 

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF ON THE ISSUE OF REMEDY


ROBERT S. MUELLER, III (SBN 59775)

United States Attorney

CHARLES M. O'CONNOR

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Environment & Natural Resources Unit

 

450 Golden Gate Avenue - P.O. Box 36055

San Francisco, California 94102

Telephone (415) 436-7180

Facsimile (415) 436-6748

 

Attorneys for Defendant

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

C 00 0877 WHA

 

FORT FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, a membership organization; SF DOG, a California limited partnership; Linda McKay, an individual; Florence Sarrett, an individual; Lindsay Kefauver, an individual; and Marion Cardinal, an individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF ON THE ISSUE

OF REMEDY

 

Hearing Date Not Scheduled

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;

Robert Stanton, Director of the National Park Service; John Reynolds, Regional Director,

Pacific West Region, National Park Service; and Brian O'Neill, General Superintendent of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area,

 

         Defendants.

 

INTRODUCTION

   On April 26, 2000, the Court filed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Probability of Success and Irreparable Injury; Request for Supplemental Briefing Concerning Remedy; Order Denying Defendants' Objection to Extra-Record Material (hereafter "FF&CL"). In it, the Court requested simultaneous briefs and replies from all parties on the issue of remedy. The Court specifically asked the parties to address what steps are required for notice and comment under Section 1.5. FF&CL 29:24-28. The defendants herein submit the following points and authorities in response to the Court's request.

   It is the defendants' understanding that it is the Court's intent to obtain the respective parties' views as to the appropriate "remedy" in connection with the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. That is to say, the Court wants to know whether any part of defendants' action to close parts of Ft. Funston should be enjoined, pending a ruling on the merits of permanent injunction. However, defendants find some ambiguity exists because of the Court's specific request that the parties address what steps are required under Section 1.5 of 36 CFR.

   By asking the parties to set forth the steps required for notice and comment under Section 1.5, the Court appears to be interested in going beyond the question of whether a preliminary injunction should be issued to preserve the status quo while the Court is in the process of deciding the merits of the case. In defendants' view, the issue of the procedure to be followed under Section 1.5 deals with the merits and the appropriateness of a permanent injunction, not interim relief.

   However, notwithstanding defendants' confusion regarding the Court's request for an explanation of the procedure under Section 1.5, they will also address that issue in the context of a remedy on the merits of permanent injunction. By addressing that issue at this time, defendants do not intend to waive, nor do they waive, their right to object to consideration of the permanent injunction without appropriate notice, full and complete briefing and argument on the merits as well as whether a permanent injunction is even appropriate in this case.

 

ARGUMENT

1. NO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE AT THIS TIME 

   The issue regarding "remedy" before the Court as a result of the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction is whether the defendants' closure of the subject area at Ft. Funston should be preliminarily enjoined pending the Court's review of the matter on the merits and a decision on whether a permanent injunction is appropriate.

   Once again, in the context of simultaneous briefs, the defendants are at a disadvantage insofar as they do not know the nature and extent of the preliminary injunction that plaintiffs seek at this time and/or the plaintiffs' rationale in seeking whatever relief they may specify at this time. In their earlier papers and at argument before the Court, plaintiffs have sought, inter alia, removal of the fencing or movement of the fencing toward the ocean to reduce the size of the protected area. In response to the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), the Court ordered the Park Service to keep the gates open to the area seasonally closed, pending the hearing on the preliminary injunction, or until the swallows returned and the Park Service declared an emergency. Transcript of Proceedings on TRO, 84:6-25. Defendants' position is that a preliminary injunction requiring either removal of the fencing or movement of it toward the ocean is not appropriate at this stage of the proceedings. Those remedies should be considered only after full briefing and a hearing on the merits. See argument below.

   The Court has already recognized that the facts regarding the closure of the area have changed, since the filing of the Complaint and the hearing on the TRO, as a result of the emergency closure declared by the National Park Service when the bank swallows returned in April, 2000. That closure is not the subject of the Complaint, and therefore it is not before this Court or otherwise subject to review at this time. Accordingly, the Court has declared that no injunction will become effective until August, after the bank swallows have departed for the year. FF&CL, 30:1-4.

  Moreover, no preliminary injunction related to the closed areas should be issued or become effective in August, 2000, for two reasons. First, even though the Court has preliminarily found, that the plaintiffs will be irreparably injured as a result of the closure under Section 1.5(c), before the nature and extent of any injunction altering the status quo is entered, the balance of hardships should be closely examined. At this time the Court will find that the relative balance of the hardships is heavily in favor defendants and their efforts designed to protect the natural resources, including the protected bank swallow, from environmental injury.

   It will be recalled that the closure of the subject area was ordered by the Park Service for the following reasons: to protect the threatened bank swallow and its habitat, to provide for revegetation, by deterring further erosion and reintroduction of native plants; and, to preserve the safety of the public at Ft. Funston. AR US6615-18. Thus, the Park Service was concerned about the likelihood of injury and threatened injury to the environment if dogs off leash and certain other visitor uses continued without regulation. Where such injury is likely to the environment, as it is here, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the balance of harms favors protection of the environment, and no injunction should issue against the interests of the environment in cases such as that before this Court. See, Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).

   The injury to defendants' interests here is to environmental concerns, i.e., the loss of the habitat for a listed bird species, the protected bird species itself, and the loss of native plant life. The Ninth Circuit has long recognized that when considering a preliminary injunction that will affect a listed species, the balance of hardships always tips in favor of protecting the listed species, i.e., here the bank swallows. See, Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987).  When weighed against the harm to the threatened bank swallows and their habitat, the alleged hardships for plaintiffs and non-parties to the action due to their decreased seasonal enjoyment of the grounds at Ft. Funston, the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of defendants protection of a listed species and its habitat and other environmental interests at risk.

   In addition, the public interest favors refusal of a preliminary injunction, in favor of protection of the environment, at this time. See, American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 964-66 (9th Cir. 1983).

   The second reason that the Court should not enter a preliminary injunction requiring the movement or removal of the fences, or even opening of the gates is that National Park Service Regulations prohibit dogs off leash in the National Parks. 36 CFR § 2.15(a)(2).[1] The gravamen of the plaintiffs' Complaint is the restoration of their ability to walk dogs off leash in the newly closed areas. In the context of this case, if the Court were to issue such an order, members of the plaintiff dog walker organizations, as well as members of the dog walking public (as informed by the local media), are likely to be mislead into believing that they can thereafter legally resume walking their dogs in these areas off leash, when in fact they would be in violation of Park Service Regulations and subject to penalties for such violations. Moreover, this Court should not issue any preliminary injunction which could be misleading or likely to be interpreted as authorizing wholesale violations of Park Service Regulations.

   It appears that the Court, in its FF&CL, erroneously believed that the NPS regulation that prohibits dogs off leash is not presently operative at Ft. Funston and that the local GGNRA rules would allow dogs off leash in the closed areas, if the gates of the enclosure are opened or the fences are removed. The Court may have been mislead in this regard by plaintiffs' arguments and their citation to and reliance upon authority that has been superceded, i.e., Section (a)(2)(iii) of the GGNRA compendium, signed July 8, 1996, (hereafter "the 1996 compendium") which the Court erroneously characterized as an "amendment to 36 CFR § 1." FF&CL, 3:9-10, n. 2, and 27:5-8. In fact, that 1996 compendium and the cited provisions regarding dog walking off leash in GGNRA were superceded and are not applicable at this time because of the issuance of a subsequent compendium on December 19, 1997 (hereafter "the 1997 compendium"). This 1997 compendium is currently in effect and still operative as the most recent compendium for GGNRA, including Ft. Funston. The 1997 compendium does not include Section (a)(2)(iii) from the 1996 compendium or any other provision which allows off leash dog walking at Ft. Funston. See text of 1997 compendium AR US01485-1520.

   To clarify, the regulatory role of the compendium is to publish, in one document which can be made available to the public, all local limitations, closures, permit requirements and other restrictions currently imposed at a particular National Park or Recreation Area relating to actions taken under Section 1.5. The authority for GGNRA's compendium is contained in 36 CFR § 1.7(b).[2] There is no authority in that regulation for a superintendent to issue local rules, etc. which relax or are contrary to Park Service regulations, including 36 CFR § 2.15, which specifically prohibits physically unconfined pets such as dogs off leash.

   Accordingly, to avoid any confusion or impression that dogs off leash are allowed in the areas presently enclosed by the fences, the Court should refrain from issuing any preliminary injunction which requires opening of the gates or removal or movement of the fences. In the alternative, if the Court decides to issue a preliminary injunction involving any opening, alteration or removal of the fencing, it should include a specific provision which recognizes and emphasizes the applicability of 36 CFR § 2.15(a)(2) and, specifically, the prohibition of dogs off leash in those same areas. In this regard, neither the provisions of the 1996 compendium nor the failure of the Park Service to enforce the leash requirements in the past can be considered an infirmity which forecloses enforcement of the prohibition now or in the future. See, Mausolf v. Babbitt,125 F.3d 661, 669, n. 10 ("Although the NPS neglected to enforce this provision and allowed snowmobiling to continue despite regulations to the contrary, the subsequent closure order restricting snowmobiling does not amount to "significant alteration" in what was previously an unlawful public use of the park.") For all of the foregoing reasons, no preliminary injunction should require the closed areas be reopened pending a ruling on the merits.

 

2. NO PERMANENT INJUNCTION SHOULD BE ISSUED IF REMAND IS ORDERED

   As discussed above, in plaintiffs' papers and especially in their oral arguments, they suggest that the Court order the defendants to move the fences surrounding the closure area some distance toward the ocean, and that would provide all necessary protection for the bank swallows nesting on the face of the cliffs along the beach. Alternatively, they argue that the fences should be removed and the area re-opened for all uses, especially off-leash dog walking. As set forth in argument above, plaintiffs' position on this subject is myopic and disregards the facts of record. First, the recent closures were carried out for multiple purposes and protection of the bank swallows nesting area is only one of the reasons. Plaintiffs' position does not deal with the other reasons for the closures, all of which are valid exercises of the NPS's authority to protect the natural resources and environment from harm. See discussion of the reasons for the closures in Part I., above. Second, plaintiffs' arguments totally ignore NPS regulation, 36 CFR § 2.15, which prohibits dogs off-leash in National Recreation Areas and Parks. As more fully set forth in Part I., above, the Court should not empower or give the impression of sanctioning violation of that regulation by issuing an injunction which authorizes or appears to authorize violation of the regulation.

   There is another, even more compelling reason that this Court should not order the fences removed or moved toward the ocean as plaintiffs have requested. This case involves the review of the procedure followed by the Park Service with regard to the closure of the subject area of Ft. Funston. That review is governed by the Judicial Review Chapter of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. One of the principles governing that review is that the Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Naval Air Development Center, 435 U.S. 519, 555 (1978). Therefore, the Court should not try to decide where the fences should be located, or whether they should be erected at all, based solely on the contradictory evidence presented by the parties to the suit. Instead, should the Court ultimately find on the merits that the Park Service did not follow its own regulations, the correct course of action would be to order remand to the Park Service for compliance with all appropriate procedures before deciding upon a closure and/or size of the closure or the location of the boundaries for it.   

   Assuming the Court ultimately does find a need to order remand, the Court has asked the parties to address what steps are required for notice and comment under Section 1.5. FF&CL, 29:24-27. The scenario on remand will depend, in part, on the nature of whatever closure the Park Service decides to propose, given what has transpired on the ground and in this judicial proceeding since the original closure.

   For purpose of this response to the Court's inquiry, the defendants will assume that the Court's ruling on the merits is the same or similar to its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the motion for preliminary injunction. Under those circumstances, if the Park Service decides it still wants to close portions of Ft. Funston under the authority of 36 CFR §1.5, its first step would be to decide whether the closure "will result in a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the park area, etc." and/or "is of a highly controversial nature," pursuant to Section 1.5(b). If, at that time, the proposed closure and fence placement are the same or similar to those presently before this Court, then the Park Service's decision will be guided by the Court's ruling on the merits. On remand, if the Park Service reconfigures, changes the size or boundaries, or otherwise significantly alters the nature of the proposed closure, then a determination under the criteria of Section 1.5(b) will be made and, if answered in the affirmative, the next step would be to follow the notice and comment procedure, pursuant to Section 1.5(b).   
   The steps for notice and comment under Section 1.5(b) would involve, first, the publication of the proposed closure as a "Notice" in the Federal Register and giving the public 30/60 days to comment on the proposal. Next, the NPS, after receipt of the comments, would evaluate them and then make a decision on how to go forward. The final step would be to publish the NPS's final decision/rule in the Federal Register.

 

CONCLUSION

    Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction which opens the closed areas or which removes or modifies the fences surrounding the closed areas for two reasons. First, for purposes of designing and ordering an appropriate preliminary injunction, the Court must fully evaluate the relative balance of hardships. Here the relative balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of defendants' action to protect the environment, especially as to those measures which are designed to protect the threatened bank swallow. The case law is unambiguous in this regard, and no injunction should be issued on motion for preliminary injunction or upon a decision on the merits. Moreover, no injunction, preliminary or final, should be issued with regard to the closed areas if it implies or may be interpreted as authorizing off-leash dog walking by plaintiffs or anyone else in violation of NPS regulation, 36 CFR 2.15(a)(2).

   Finally, if the Court remands the subject closure to the NPS for compliance with notice and comment under 36 CFR §1.5, and the Park Service decides to carry out the same closure now before the Court, it would publish the proposed closure in the Federal Register and give the public 30 to 60 days to comment on it. Upon expiration of that period, the Park Service would evaluate the comments and then make a decision as to how it would proceed.


 

NOTES

 

[1]

(a) The following are prohibited:... (2) Failing to crate, cage, restrain on a leash which shall not exceed six feet in length, or otherwise physically confine a pet at all times.

 

[2]

In addition to the above-described notification procedures, the superintendent shall compile in writing all the designations, closures, permit requirements and other restrictions imposed under discretionary authority. This compilation shall be updated annually and made available to the public upon request.

The "compilation" is known as a compendium.


 

 

DATED: May 4, 2000                                     

 

 

 

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT S. MUELLER, III

United States Attorney

 

CHARLES M. O'CONNOR

Assistant United States Attorney

 

 

 

 

OF COUNSEL:

 

Ralph Mihan

Field Solicitor

U.S. Department of the Interior

 




INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY'S BRIEF RE: APPROPRIATE REMEDY


CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PROJECT

LAURENS H. SILVER, Esq. # 55339

302 Sycamore Street

Mill Valley, CA 94941

Tel: (415) 383-5688 Fax: (415) 383-7995

 

KELLY L. DRUMM, Esq. # 172767

1168 Dolores Street

San Francisco, CA 94110

Tel: (415) 826-9067 Fax: (415) 826-9421

 

Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor

Golden Gate Audubon Society

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

C 000877 WHA

 

FORT FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, an

Unincorporated Membership Organization;

SF DOG, a California limited Partnership, LINDA MCKAY an Individual; FLORENCE SARRETT, An Individual; LINDSAY KEFAUVER, an Individual; and MARION CARDINAL, an Individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON

SOCIETY 'S BRIEF

RE: APPROPRIATE REMEDY

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;

ROBERT STANTON, Director of the National

Park Service; JOHN REYNOLDS, Regional

Director, Pacific West Region, National Park

Service; and BRIAN O'NEILL, General

Superintendent of the Golden Gate National

Recreation Area,

 

         Defendants.

 

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY, a

California Non-profit Membership Organization,

 

Intervenor/Defendant.

Hearing Date: April 14, 2000

Time: 8:00 a.m.

Courtroom 9

 

Hon. Judge Alsup

 

 

 

 

 


INTRODUCTION

            This Supplemental Brief of Defendant/Intervenor Golden Gate Audubon Society is being submitted in response to this Court's invitation in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Probability of Success and Irreparable Injury, filed April 25, 2000, to the parties to submit briefs on the issue of remedy.

DISCUSSION

            In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Probability of Success and Irreparable Injury, this Court stated: "Although the National Park Service generally requires that pets be on leash in nations parks, the Park Service allows dog owners to walk their dogs off-leash at Fort Funston." Opinion at p. 2. The Court cited Section (a)(2)(iii) of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area ("GGNRA") Compendium Amendment to 36 C.F.R. 1, dated July 8, 1996. (A.R. USO 1472, GGNRA, 36 C.F.R. 1, Compendium Amendment, July 8, 1996.) However, the Compendium Amendment presently in effect, dated December 19, 1997 (A.R. USO 1485, GGNRA, 36 C.F.R. 1 1997), does not include any such explicit "authorization" of off-leash dog walking. In fact, the 1997 Compendium Amendment, prepared by the Park Service pursuant to 36 C.F.R. 1.7(b), deleted the language of the 1996 Compendium Amendment which designated at Fort Funston "voice-control areas where obedient pets, under supervision, may be allowed off-leash."

This is a critical factor which the Court must consider in determining the balance of hardships and the scope of any injunctive relief. As defendant/intervenors argued in their brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiffs are using Fort Funston, a unit of the GGNRA, as an area for walking dogs off-leash, in a manner that violates the general prohibition, set forth in 36 C.F.R. 2.15, of having dogs off-leash in parklands administered by the National Park Service. By deleting in 1997 the "authorization" of off-leash dog walking at Fort Funston contained in the 1996 Compendium, the Park Service made it clear that the status quo ante was being restored: that dog walkers exercising their dogs off-leash at Fort Funston were doing so without explicit authorization and were doing so on the "sufferance" of the Park Service. At best, the Park Service was engaging in a policy of selective non-enforcement at Fort Funston of its otherwise uniform policy of not permitting dogs off-leash within the GGNRA, consistent with 36 C.F.R. 2.15, except where there was an established authorization permitting such off­leash dog walking.

            Plaintiffs are seeking relief that would, after the seasonal departure of the Bank Swallows in August, involve this Court's setting aside of the Park Service's recently designated permanent closure area in order to restore the status quo ante. A restoration of the status quo ante would sanction, with the imprimatur of this Court, unauthorized off-leash dog walking in the "permanently closed" area during such time as the Park Service may be preparing new closure orders that would be subject to public hearing. Under this scenario the Court would be allowing a use (off-leash, off-trail, dog walking) not authorized under any provision of the Code of Federal Regulations, or the Compendium Amendment to those regulations adopted by GGNRA.

Defendant/Intervenors do not believe plaintiffs are entitled to any equitable relief whatsoever, since they are not authorized users of the GGNRA for the principal purpose for which they are suing -- the off-leash walking of their dogs in areas the Park Service desires to revegitate.1 To the extent this Court finds on the merits that plaintiffs have a high probability of success, it may simply issue preliminary declaratory relief setting forth its view of the law, and the Park Service can take appropriate steps to take action consistent with any preliminary declaratory relief order.2

 

Temporary or preliminary declaratory relief is appropriate when it is the least intrusive manner of vindicating plaintiffs' rights to proceed in federal court. In Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Doe, 868 F.Supp, 532, 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1994), the Court noted:

"Given the ability of the Court to issue a final declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. §2201, which is equitable in nature, this Court also has the power to issue such provisional equitable relief when it is necessary based on the urgency of the situation, the irreparable harm that would otherwise occur, and the remaining factors which courts consider when granting provisional injunctive relief. Some courts have indeed acknowledged that temporary or preliminary declaratory relief is available to litigants as a provisional remedy. [citations omitted] ...

Preliminary declaratory relief in this case should be conditioned on the same familiar standards that the Court of Appeals has instructed should be applied to motions for preliminary injunctions, To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction the party requesting relief mist show: (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief. International Bhd. Of Teamsters v. Local Union No. 810, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2nd Cir. 1979)."

A preliminary declaratory relief order was recently entered by this Court in National Audubon Society, et. al. v. Davis  (C.98-4610 CAL), in which this Court, the Hon. C.A, Legge, presiding, preliminarily declared that Proposition 4 (the anti-trapping initiative voter-enacted in 1998), was not intended to ban the use of leg-hold traps by federal officials for the purpose of protecting endangered and threatened species from predation. A copy of that preliminary declarative order, issued in lieu of a preliminary injunction order, is attached as Exhibit A to this memorandum. Defendant/intervenor believes temporary declaratory relief is the least intrusive and most appropriate remedy in this case.

 

If any equitable relief is granted, the Court should not frame that equitable relief in a manner that sanctions a use specifically prohibited by 36 C.F.R. 2.15 during such time as the Park Service is considering new closures. Thus, any order by this Court that terminates (after August) the Year 2000 closures at Fort Funston should make clear that only on-leash dog walking on established trails or appropriately signed rights-of-ways (such as beach access along the boundary between the seasonally closed area and the permanently closed area) is, in this interim period, permitted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant/intervenor urge this Court to reconsider the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Regarding Probability of Success and Irreparable Injury in light of the language of the 1997 Compendium Amendment which deleted the language of the 1996 Compendium Amendment which designated at Fort Funston "voice-control areas where obedient pets, under supervision, may be allowed off-leash." Should this Court determine to grant plaintiffs equitable relief, defendant/intervenor urges this Court to do so in the form of a preliminary declaratory relief order as discussed, supra .


NOTES

1     Defendant/Intervenors argued in their Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion  for Preliminary Injunction, at page 4:

 

No principle of federal land law is clearer that that no implied license to use federal lands free of regulation arises from a pattern of long-term use. As the court stated in

Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918), Congress has not conferreed upon citizens the right to graze livestock upon the public lands. Similarly, Congress has conferred no rights on dog owners who use Ft. Funston. The failure of the United States to object to a use or prosecute an unlawful use, or the countenancing of a long term use confers "no vested right on the complainant, nor did it deprive the United States of any power of recalling any implied license under the which the land had been used for private purposes." Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); see also, United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).

2     Such preliminary declarative relief. would provide:

"This Court hereby preliminarily declares and orders that plaintiffs have demonstrated a high probability of success on the merits of their claim that defendants have violated 36 C.F.R. 1.5(b) in failing to provide notice and comment rule-making in connection with the Year 2000 closures of areas within Fort Funston National Recreation Area to protect Bank Swallows, for revegitation of native plants, and for public safety."

 

 

Dated. May 4, 2000

Respectfully submitted,

 

CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

PROJECT

By:         [Signed]

               Laurens H. Silver

               Kelly L. Drumm

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 




PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM RE: PROVISIONAL REMEDY PENDING DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS


 

 

LYDIA OWEN BOESCH (CA Bar No. 147901)

110 Maywood Drive

San Francisco, CA 94127-2040

Telephone: (415) 841-1060

Facsimile: (415) 841-0437

 

JOHN B. KEATING (CA Bar No. 148729)

2995 Woodside Road, Suite 350

Woodside, CA 94062

Telephone: (650) 851-5900

Facsimile: (650) 851-5912

 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

 

 

                                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

                                           NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

 


FT. FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, a membership organization; SFDOG, a California limited partnership; Linda McKay, an individual; Florence Sarrett, an individual; Lindsay Kefauver; an individual; and Marion Cardinal, an individual,

 

Plaintiffs,

 

v.

 

Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior; Robert Stanton, Director of the National Park Service; John Reynolds, Regional Director, Pacific West Region, National Park Service; and Brian O'Neill, General Superintendent of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area,

 

Defendants,

 

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY, a California Nonprofit Membership Organization,

 

Intervenor/Defendant.

____________________________________


)

)

)


 

 

Case No. C-00-0877 WHA

 

 

 

 

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM

RE: PROVISIONAL REMEDY PENDING DETERMINATION ON THE MERITS                                 

 

 

 

Date:    (None set)

Time:

Ctrm:    Hon. William H. Alsup

 

 

 


                                                                    SUMMARY


This Court has found that plaintiffs have shown a probability that the National Park Service violated its own regulations requiring notice and opportunity for public comment before implementing a closure of a portion of Fort Funston.  Plaintiffs maintain that case law supports an order that the closed land be reopened by removal of the recently installed fences. Plaintiffs, however, acknowledge the waste of resources that will result if the fences are removed only to be reinstalled lawfully if the closure is determined to be valid following rulemaking.

Plaintiffs would like to be reasonable and propose a remedy which permits access to the closed lands through openings in the fences, to allow defendants a brief period of time in which to complete the rulemaking process.  Plaintiffs, however, doubt whether rulemaking can be commenced and completed in a short time period.  Accordingly, removal of the fences may be the only available and appropriate remedy.

                                                                  ARGUMENT

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to "preserve the status quo pending a determination of the action on the merits." Chalk v. U.S. District Court Central District of California, 840 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1988); Matthews v. NCAA, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (E.D. Wash. 1999).   In this case, the status quo is to return the ten acres in question to their condition prior to the closure -- unfenced and open for use and enjoyment by the plaintiffs, with the beauty of the park unmarred by the new fences.

Plaintiffs, however, are mindful of the expense already incurred by the Park Service, albeit through grant funds, and the substantial physical labor required to construct the fences.  Plaintiffs would like to avoid the waste of resources that would result if the Court orders the fences to be removed, only to have the fences subsequently reinstalled as a result of rulemaking.  On the other hand, plaintiffs believe that they should not be further denied access to the closed area during a brief rulemaking process.


Based on this approach, plaintiffs propose that they be allowed access to the closed area as follows.  Access to the seasonal closure could be accomplished by removal of the two gates installed on April 12, 2000, pursuant to the Park Service's declaration of an "emergency." Access to the permanent closure could be achieved by removing the fencing materials (the wire mesh and cables) at three locations marked on the map attached at Exhibit A, while leaving the fence posts in place.  Generally, the three proposed openings into the permanent closure are located at two points along the Coastal Trail and at a point in the fence which separates the permanent closure from the seasonal closure.  This point is in the "valley" of the closed area and would allow plaintiffs to resume walking through this area, as many did prior to the closure, as well as through the beach access route known as the "Gap." Each opening should be a minimum of thirty feet wide.

Regarding the timing of plaintiffs' proposed access, access to the seasonal area should be given immediately, as there appear to be no bank swallow burrows in the cliffs within the seasonal closure.  Declaration of Michael Goldstein, ¶ 6, submitted herewith.  Plaintiffs appreciate the Park Service's initial desire to close the cliffs in this area after the bank swallows arrived, in order to protect the swallows as they established their nesting sites.  As demonstrated by the Goldstein Declaration, however, the bank swallows have returned to the location they left last year and have inhabited for several years, i.e., an area in the cliffs of the permanent closure, between the Gap and Panama Point.  Goldstein Declaration, ¶ 3. No need exists, therefore, to keep the seasonal area closed, now that the bank swallows have established their burrows away from these cliffs.

Regarding the permanent closure, both the Park Service and the Audubon Society admitted under oath during the Court's view of Fort Funston that a fence thirty feet back from the edge of the cliffs would protect the bank swallows.  Moreover, in its February 2, 1999 Project Statement (US00262-US00266), the Park Service recommended erecting "a permanent fence along the top of the cliff" in order to protect the bank swallows.  Certainly, it can be concluded that a fence along the cliffs, placed no more than thirty feet from the edge, adequately will protect the bank swallows.

In addition, plaintiffs maintain that these protective fences may be installed in a short period of time, say a week to ten days.  Considering the lightening speed with which the fences were installed to effectuate the closure, the Park Service should be able to install fences along the cliffs in the permanent closure in less than ten days.  If desirable also to protect potential future bank swallow habitat, fences could be installed along the cliffs in the seasonal area as well.  Plaintiffs also propose that appropriate fences be installed around the small area in which "native plants" recently were planted in the permanent closure.


In summary, under this proposal, access to the seasonal closure would be ordered immediately, and access to the permanent closure would be ordered to take effect no more than ten days following the Court's order regarding provisional remedies.  This proposal is premised on defendants' ability to complete rulemaking within a short period of time, e.g., between sixty to ninety days.  In other words, if rulemaking can be accomplished quickly, plaintiffs believe that allowing the fence posts to remain in place, with the proposed access points, while new fences are installed along the cliffs to protect the bank swallows, is a reasonable approach that may avoid unnecessary waste, protect the threatened species, and provide plaintiffs with some access to this ten-acre area, although limited.  If rulemaking cannot be accomplished quickly, a remedy which provides plaintiffs with only limited access to the closed land is not sufficient.

Plaintiffs have grave doubts about whether the rulemaking process can or will be completed within a brief period of time, and whether, once completed, the results will support the closure.  First, there hasn't been a judgment in this case.  The Park Service may be unwilling even to begin the rulemaking process until a final determination has been made as to whether the closure is "highly controversial" or results in a "substantial alteration in the public use pattern" of the land.

Second, even if the Park Service does publish the closure as rulemaking, there is no certainty that, at the end of the rulemaking process, the closure will be determined valid.  Depending on the contents of the proposed rule, plaintiffs expect to challenge vigorously any further infringement on or restriction of their use of this area of Fort Funston.  It is not equitable to deny plaintiffs their use and enjoyment of this land when the outcome of rulemaking is so uncertain, and possibly could result in plaintiffs' favor.


Third, and most important, plaintiffs doubt whether defendants can complete the rulemaking process in a brief period of time.  Plaintiffs expect the process to take many months, and possibly up to or more than one year.  Department of Interior internal documents strongly suggest that the rulemaking process is very complex and extremely time-consuming.  Plaintiffs have located on the Department of Interior's web site (www.doi.gov) a Department of Interior Department Manual (A318 DM") which addresses the department's procedures for publishing proposed rules in the Federal Register.[1]  Portions of this manual are attached as Exhibit B.

318 DM 1 lists ten steps that "must" be taken before a proposed rule is published in the Federal Register (Ex. B, p. 1). These steps include preparing a "regulatory alert form," obtaining a "regulatory identification number," including the rule in the "semiannual agenda," including the rule in the "OMB regulatory report," and preparing and circulating a "record of compliance."

The "regulatory alert form," "semiannual agenda," and "OMB regulatory report" are discussed more fully in 318 DM 2 (Ex. B, pp 3-6).  The "semiannual agenda" is a "list of rulemaking actions scheduled for review or development in the coming 12-month period" and is published in the Federal Register every April and October.  318 DM 2, § 2.4 (Ex B, p. 4).

318 DM 3 describes preparation of the Record of Compliance (ROC), which appears to be a lengthy and time-consuming procedure (Ex. B, pp. 7-49).  As stated in § 3.3 of 318 DM 3, "The ROC serves as proof that we've met all legal requirements, thus decreasing the chance that the rule will be litigated.  It is also a record of why and how we developed the rule.  This will be useful when the rule is revised in the future" (Ex. B, p. 7).

A minimum of sixty days is required for public comment after a proposed rule is published in the Federal Register.  318 DM 5, § 5.4 (Ex. B, p. 60).  318 DM 5, § 5.13 (Ex. B, p. 62) provides additional actions that should be considered, including "holding public meetings or hearings." Perhaps the four years of public meetings and hearings that were held before proposed rules were published in Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt were pursuant to this suggestion in the Departmental Manual.  See Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1458-1459 (9th Cir. 1996).


Plaintiffs have not requested, nor have they been provided, any documentation from defendants regarding the required procedures for publishing the proposed closure as rulemaking in the Federal Register.  The Departmental Manual described above is the only Department of Interior publication plaintiffs could locate which discusses rulemaking procedures.  This manual appears to discuss in clear detail the precise steps that must be followed before a proposed rule may even be published.  Once published as proposed, at least sixty days are required for comment.  Once published as final, thirty days are required before the rule becomes effective.  318 DM 6, § 6.25 (Ex. B, p. 71).  Assuming defendants don't even commence rulemaking at the earliest until this Court issues an order regarding remedy, just the time required for the comment period (sixty days) and preceding the effective date (thirty days) totals ninety days.  Based simply on these requirements, the fences would not be removed until the middle or end of August.  This doesn't even allow for the numerous steps that must be completed internally within the Department of Interior before the rule is even published in the Federal Register.

Certainly, defendants were aware, or should have been aware, of the complex steps and lengthy time requirements of publishing a proposed rule in the Federal Register.  Notwithstanding this awareness, the Park Service quickly installed 1,750 linear feet of fencing (US04208) thereby depriving plaintiffs daily of the use and enjoyment of one of the last remaining coastal bluffs at Fort Funston.  This closure also has deprived plaintiffs of valuable use of a beach access route, created a significant and ongoing public safety concern on the beach, and damaged the wonderful beauty of this area of the park.  Why should plaintiffs suffer the punitive impact of defendants' probable malfeasance while defendants take months, or possibly even a year or more, to follow the prescribed rulemaking process?


Under the lengthy rulemaking circumstances set forth above, the fences should not be allowed to stand.  The seasonal closure should be reopened immediately through removal of the gates, as discussed above.[2]  The Park Service then should be allowed no more than ten days to construct fences or implement some other protective mechanism along the cliffs in the permanent closure to protect the bank swallows, as well as install a fence around the recently planted vegetation.  Once these protective fences are installed, the recently installed fences should be removed.  Defendants then would have ample time to thoughtfully consider what course of action to take with respect to this land, and then to implement this plan.  To deny plaintiffs this remedy would only reward the Park Service's actions and possibly encourage similar unilateral actions on their part in the future.  The Park Service then could continue a pattern of eviscerating public input with a fait accompli the public is forced to accept.

                                                                 CONCLUSION

Preserving the status quo in this case, pending a determination on the merits, may mean nothing short of removing all of the recently installed fences.  Only with the fences removed may plaintiffs fully use and enjoy this last large coastal bluff at Fort Funston, and the pre-fenced beauty of the park be restored.  Plaintiffs, however, urge the Park Service to install appropriate fences or employ other measures to assure protection of the bank swallows if the fences are removed.  A remedy which allows plaintiffs to use the land without removal of the fences may be appropriate while defendants seek to validate the closure through rulemaking, only if plaintiffs' use of the land is restricted for a brief period of time while the rulemaking process is completed.

 

 

Dated:  May 4, 2000                                                   ____________________________________

LYDIA OWEN BOESCH

JOHN B. KEATING

 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs



[1]  This manual was located by searching the Department of Interior's web site for "rulemaking." The first item in the search result is entitled, "Rulemaking Guidelines - DOI." This  item is a link to a document entitled, "Rulemaking Guidelines and Resources, Department of Interior." There is a link at the top of this document entitled, "Analytical Requirements -- Guidelines." These "Analytical Requirements" are set forth at 318 DM 3, Appendix 3 to Chapter 3 (Ex. B, pp. 19-43).

[2]  Plaintiffs acknowledge the possibility that the bank swallows might attempt to establish burrows in the cliffs of the seasonal closure after this area is reopened.  Plaintiffs do not know how likely this possibility is, but doubt its likelihood, as it is believed that the bank swallows have not nested in this area previously and the cliffs appear to be unsuitable as bank swallow habitat.  If the bank swallows do establish burrows in this area after the area is opened, plaintiffs would expect the Park Service to install fences or implement other protective measures on these cliffs to protect the new burrows.



 

LYDIA OWEN BOESCH (CA Bar No. 147901)

110 Maywood Drive

San Francisco, CA 94127-2040

Telephone: (415) 841-1060

Facsimile: (415) 841-0437

 

JOHN B. KEATING (CA Bar No. 148729)

2995 Woodside Road, Suite 350

Woodside, CA 94062

Telephone: (650) 851-5900

Facsimile: (650) 851-5912

 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

 

 

                                               UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

                                           NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

 


FT. FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, a membership organization; SFDOG, a California limited partnership; Linda McKay, an individual; Florence Sarrett, an individual; Lindsay Kefauver; an individual; and Marion Cardinal, an individual,

 

Plaintiffs,

 

v.

 

Bruce BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior; Robert Stanton, Director of the National Park Service; John Reynolds, Regional Director, Pacific West Region, National Park Service; and Brian O'Neill, General Superintendent of the Golden Gate National Recreation Area,

 

Defendants,

 

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY, a California Nonprofit Membership Organization,

 

Intervenor/Defendant.

____________________________________


)

)

)


 

 

Case No. C-00-0877 WHA

 

 

 

 

DECLARATION OF MICHAEL B. GOLDSTEIN RE: PICTURES TAKEN OF CLIFFS AT FORT FUNSTON      

 

 

 


I, Michael B. Goldstein, state as follows:

1.         I am a member of Ft. Funston Dog Walkers.

2.         I prepare this declaration in order to show the Court pictures I recently took of the cliffs at Fort Funston.  Specifically, these pictures show numerous bank swallow burrows in the cliffs of the permanently closed area, and no bank swallow burrows in the cliffs of the seasonal area.

3.         Attached to this declaration as Exhibits A, B, and C are copies of pictures I took on May 3, 2000 between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. of the cliffs in the "permanent" area.  As noted on these copies, all of the bank swallow burrows are located in an area between the beach access point known as "The Gap" and Panama Point.

4.         Also attached to this declaration as Exhibits D through L are copies of pictures I took on May 2, 2000 between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. of the cliffs in the "seasonal" area.  These pictures were taped together and are shown as panels in order to show the full range of the cliffs.

5.         The pictures of the seasonal cliffs generally are shown from north to south.  That is, the portion of the fence shown in the pictures at Exhibit D is the fence separating the permanent from the seasonal area.  The portion of the fence shown at the top of the pictures in Exhibit L above the concrete structure is the fence at the south border of the seasonal area.

6.         I have been inspecting the cliffs in the seasonal area approximately three times per week for the past three weeks.  During this time, I have not seen any bank swallow burrows in the cliffs of this area.  I believe that there are no bank swallow burrows shown in the attached pictures of the cliffs of the seasonal area.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 3rd day of May, 2000 in San Francisco, California.

 

 

Signed,

____________________________________

MICHAEL B. GOLDSTEIN


[Editor's Note: Michael B. Goldstein is editor of this website, Fort Funston Forum.]

 


 

        SUMMARY of APRIL 26th COURT ORDER:

         On April 26, 2000, in the case of Ft Funston Dog Walkers, et al. v. Babbitt, et al., the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found that there was a probability that the National Park Service violated its own regulations requiring notice and opportunity for public comment before implementing a closure of certain park lands at Fort Funston. The Court has requested the parties to submit briefs on May 4, 2000 as to a provisional remedy.

         At issue is ten acres of land at Fort Funston which the Park Service closed in March, 2000, without any public input and despite known controversy. If the Court found that the closure was "highly controversial" or resulted in a "significant alteration" in the use of the land, the Park Service is required to publish the closure as rulemaking in the Federal Register.

         The Court concluded that the closure was "highly controversial," basing its decision, in part, on numerous e-mails prepared by staff members of Golden Gate National Recreation Area. These e-mails demonstrate that, for months before the closure, there was "pervasive recognition within the National Park Service that the new closure would be controversial." Nonetheless, the Park Service proceeded with its plans, while seeking to "preclude or minimize" input from the dog walkers.

         In summarizing the e-mails, the Court stated, "These excerpts show an intent on the part of the National Park Service to railroad through the closure, to maintain secrecy, to unleash the fencing with lightening speed, and to establish a fait accompli." The Court also noted that Brian O'Neill, General Superintendent of GGNRA, had promised in 1995, after a similar, unpopular closure at Fort Funston, that no further closure would be made.

         The Court also found that the dog walkers raised serious questions regarding whether the closure would create a significant alteration in the public use of the land. The Court noted that the government ignored the 1995 closure of similar and adjacent land, as well as the relative use and distinctive features of the closed property.


FULL TEXT of APRIL 26th COURT ORDER:


TO PRINT: Click here for a standalone version of the order.


 

                                                                      

 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 

No. C 00-00877 WHA

 

FT. FUNSTON DOG WALKERS, a

membership organization; SFDOG, a California

limited partnership; LINDA MCKAY, an

individual; FLORENCE SARRETT, an

individual; LINDSAY KEFAUVER; an

individual; and MARION CARDINAL, an

individual,

 

 Plaintiffs,

V.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING

PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS AND

IRREPARABLE INJURY; REQUEST

FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

CONCERNING REMEDY; ORDER

DENYING DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION

TO EXTRA-RECORD MATERIAL

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary of the Interior;

ROBERT STANTON, Director of the National

Park Service; JOHN REYNOLDS, Regional

Director, Pacific West Region, National Park

Service; and BRIAN O'NEILL, General

Superintendent of the Golden Gate National

Recreation Area,

 

Defendants.

____________________________________/

GOLDEN GATE AUDUBON SOCIETY,

Intervener/Defendant.

____________________________________/

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

         On motion for preliminary injunction, this order finds that plaintiffs have shown a probability that the National Park Service violated its own regulations requiring notice and opportunity for public comment before implementing a closure of certain park lands, finds that plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury, and requests further briefing as to a provisional remedy.

 

 

STATEMENT

 

        1.        The Closure Regulation of the National Park Service

 

          The National Park Service's regulations require notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures before a closure of a park area that is of a "highly controversial nature" or that will result in "a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the park area":

Except in emergency situations, a closure, designation, use or activity restriction or condition, or the termination or relaxation of such, which is of a nature, magnitude and duration that will result in a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the park area, adversely affect the park's natural, aesthetic, scenic or cultural values, require a long-term or significant modification in the resource management objectives of the unit, or is of a highly controversial nature, shall be published as rulemaking in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

36 C.F.R. 1.5(b). Plaintiffs contend that the National Park Service violated this regulation by closing a portion of Fort Funston without first publishing the proposed closure in the Federal Register and allowing comment.1

        2.         Fort Funston

         Fort Funston is a multi-use recreational area on the coastal bluffs in southwest San Francisco overseen by the Golden Gate National Recreation Area (GGNRA), a unit of the National Park Service. Fort Funston is one of several separate public lands in the Bay Area that are superintended by the GGNRA. Others are Fort Mason, Fort Baker, the Presidio, Lands End, Alcatraz Island, Muir Woods, and Fort Miley. All told, the GGNRA encompasses approximately 76,500 acres of land and water. Fort Funston itself encompasses approximately 222 acres. Fort Funston became a part of the GGNRA in 1974, when San Francisco transferred its ownership and control to the United States. In the GGNRA's statement of purpose, Congress acknowledged both maintaining recreational open space within an urban area and preserving that area from uses that would destroy its natural character:

In order to preserve for public use and enjoyment certain areas of Marin and San Francisco Counties, California, possessing outstanding natural, historic, scenic, and recreational values, and in order to provide for the maintenance of needed recreational open space necessary to urban environment and planning, the Golden Gate National Recreation Area ... is hereby established. In the management of the recreation area, the Secretary of the Interior ... shall utilize the resources in a manner which will provide for recreation and educational opportunities consistent with sound principles of land use planning and management. In carrying out the provisions of the subchapter, the Secretary shall preserve the recreation area, as far as possible, in its natural setting, and protect it from development and uses which would destroy the scenic beauty and natural character of the area.

16 U.S.C. 460bb. Although the National Park Service generally requires that pets be on-leash in

national parks, the Park Service allows dog owners to walk their dogs off-leash at Fort Funston.2

 

         3.         Plaintiff Dog Walkers

 

         Perhaps because they may run off-leash on voice command, dogs and their owners frequent Fort Funston, although they are not its only visitors. Ft. Funston Dog Walkers was formed in 1996 so that the members could get to know one another and organize regular park clean-ups. The group has approximately 600 members. The group meets once a month on a Saturday morning. Clean-up supplies are provided to members who attend. Annual dues are ten dollars. SFDOG was formed in 1976 as a consolidated voice for dog owners in the San Francisco Bay Area. It has approximately 650 members. Both organizations are plaintiffs. Also serving as plaintiffs are four individuals. Plaintiffs Linda McKay and Lindsay Kefauver are members of Ft. Funston Dog Walkers and frequently walk their dogs in Fort Funston. Ms. McKay is one of the organizers of the Fort Funston Dog Walkers. Plaintiff Florence Sarrett belongs to SFDOG and has frequently visited Fort Funston for more than thirty years. Plaintiff Marion Cardinal is a frequent visitor to Fort Funston.

 

         4.         The Bank Swallows

 

         The closure at issue is intended to protect the bank swallow, a species listed as threatened by the California Fish and Game Commission.3  The Fort Funston colony of bank swallows winters in South America and nests in the cliffs at Fort Funston from March or April until August. They burrow small holes horizontally into eroding cliffs, just large enough for a nest. The Fort Funston colony is one of two active colonies remaining on the west coast. Their nesting site used to be at the north end of the Fort Funston cliffs. In 1997 and 1998, however, the colony moved somewhat southward after the El Nino and La Nina winters eroded much of those cliffs. Their new nesting area is still in Fort Funston but is farther south; therein lie the seeds of the controversy.

 

         5.         The 1995 Closure

 

         To protect the original nesting area of the bank swallows and for safety reasons, the National Park Service closed two sites in Fort Funston in 1995. One of the two sites covered several acres at the most northern bluffs between the beach and the Coastal Trial. The purpose of this closure was to protect the bank-swallow nesting colonies, located then on the sheer, vertical faces of the bluffs. This closure was unpopular with plaintiffs.

 

         At the time of the closures, Brian O'Neill, the General Superintendent of the GGNRA, represented to Richard Avanzino, president of the San Francisco Society for the Prevention of Cruelty for Animals, that the northern bank-swallow closure would not be expanded southward:

Ranger Milestone showed you two areas, Battery Davis' hill slope erosion control project and the Bank Swallow critical habitat, both are management concerns. The swallow habitat restoration area is nearing its completion and will not be expanded southward. To protect the newly restored habitat, pets will be required on leash while passing through the Bank Swallow trail system.

(A.R. US06438-39, ltr. from Gen. Superintendent O'Neill to R. Avanzino, Mar. 15,1995).4 At a large meeting in 1995, Ranger Jim Milestone represented to approximately 250 members of the plaintiff organizations that there would be no further closures (Undated Declaration of Linda McKay filed Apr. 3, 2000, Par.14)

 

         6.         The 2000 Closure

 

         Contrary to its statements that the bank-swallow closure would not be expanded, the National Park Service decided in 1999 to do just that. This decision was provoked by the southward move of the bank-swallow nesting. The new closure, the one now at issue, encompasses another ten acres south of the 1995 bluff closure. Fort Funston, as stated, comprises approximately 222 acres along the Pacific coast. The Coastal Trail runs roughly parallel to the beach on top of the bluffs in the northern part of the park. (See map appended hereto.)5  It is the main artery for hikers, joggers and dog walkers. The northern terminus of the Coastal Trail runs through the 1995 closure and curves westward and downward to the beach. About half of the new closure is "seasonal," meaning it is closed only while the bank swallows are in residence, and about half is permanent, meaning year-round. The new permanent closure borders and extends south of the 1995 permanent closure segment. The seasonal closure borders and extends south of the new permanent closure. The new closures are, as stated, about ten acres.

 

         The new closures comprise land between the Coastal Trail and the cliffs. This land includes undulating terrain and dunes on which dogs run, children play and adults hike. Children enjoy sliding down a steep dune called Joey's Hill. The high points offer excellent elevated scenic views of the surf. Within the closure is the middle of only three gaps providing access to the beach, the steep cliffs otherwise making the descent hazardous. This middle access is particularly important at high tide when the entire beach is awash, providing an avenue to safety midway between the other two gaps.

 

         Plaintiffs oppose the new closure for several reasons. First, they see it as a violation of the representation that there would be no further closures. Second, they contend that the area being closed is especially pleasant in the views and activities it sustains. Third, they are concerned because the closure voids the middle of three draws to and from the beach.

 

         7.         The Decision to Implement the 2000 Closure

 

         In 1998, the GGNRA started organizing to close off the bluff area south of the 1995 permanent closure. On February 2, 1999, the National Park Service generated a project statement. It recommended activities such as nest monitoring and educating the visiting public about the bank swallows and their nests (A.R. US00262-66). Importantly, the project statement also recommended restrictions on park use, including erecting a fence to protect the swallows:

Protection: It is critical to prevent access to the site during the nesting season, and especially, to preserve the cliff habitat. To accomplish this objective the following should occur: (1) Increase patrols by Park Rangers, USPP on horseback below the cliff and on foot above the cliff during the nesting season. (2) End motorcycle patrols by USPP. (3) Erect a permanent fence along the top of the cliff to prevent descent and disturbance, and erection of a temporary fence along bottom of cliff to prevent access and disturbance. (4) Close parking area near site on July 4th. (5) Limit hang gliding to north of the gully between Battery Davis and the colony, at least from midMarch until midJuly. (6) Designate an entrance to the beach area using signs and obvious trail markings.

(Ibid.). In addition the statement recommended revegetation along commonly used paths in the off-trail area:

Revegetation and Trail Access: Restore vegetation along social paths that have become established in area, especially on and above the cliff, and establish safe public routes at a nonthreatening distance from the birds.

(Ibid.). These items show that the National Park Service was contemplating fencing and revegetation as early as February 1999. Funds were received through the Public Land Corps grant program to implement the first phase of the bank-swallow habitat protection project in 1999. The funds were applied to purchasing fencing material. Ranger Sharon Farrell, a National Park Service plant ecologist, was the contact person for the project. Ranger Farrell was a central actor and proponent of the closure.

         The National Park Service did not immediately inform the public of its progressing plan. On July 31, 1999, Ranger Mary A. Petrilli, an interpretive ranger at Fort Funston, sent an email to Ranger Chris Powell, a National Park Service public relations staff member, stating that the Bank Swallow Site Extension had been approved through Project Review and that funding had been secured for the new fence line. The email was copied to six other National Park Service staff members. It warned all recipients to be "discreet" with the information in the email and cautioned that "we do not want this to blow up in our faces":

Dear Chris:

I would like to set up a meeting with you and at least some of the above-mentioned park staff to discuss the implementation of the Bank Swallow Site Extension. As most of you know, it has been approved through Project Review and Sharon has garnered funding for new fence line to be installed.

However, we do not want this to blow up in our faces and need to come up with a plan with a timeline on it. **In particular, I would like to focus on how our resource-education/public information should be handled. We have many park advocates willing to help out (CNPS, Audubon, USFWS).

Let's meet within a month to set up an Action Plan. I would like to schedule the SFCC work crew during the last week of August and I need to get my plant list to Betty soon for next winter's work.

Thursdays would probably be the best day for most of the staff listed. Please name two that would work for you to come to the Southern Lands.

* *NOTE: Everyone copied on this should be very discreet with this information, PLEASE. If you cannot attend the meeting, minutes will be recorded and sent out. Let me know who else I should include on this list -- but keep in mind this is in the preliminary stages. * *

Thank you!

Sincerely,

-Mary

(A.R. US06293, email from M. Petrilli to C. Powell, July 31, 1999) (emphasis added). In September 1999, the National Park Service was hoping to put up the fences in October before the rainy season (A.R. US06225, email from S. Farrell to T. Fortmann, et al., Sept. 1, 1999).

         On October 27, 1999, Ranger Farrell wrote the following email to Ron Schlorff of the California Department of Fish and Game soliciting official DFG input that recreation at Fort Funston should be curtailed to protect the bank swallows:

Hi Ron
 I hope you are well, thanks again for visiting Funston and supporting our restoration and protection efforts. I apologize for your not receiving this earlier, I have had some challenges with the reliability of my email.

We are presenting the project to part of the Park's Citizen's Advisory Commission meeting on Monday, and hope that we will be able to construct the fence prior to the onslaught of this years rains. It would certainly be helpful to have any support that you can lend. Specifically it would be really great if you could touch upon the following issues within your letter to the park.

Please provide a brief background on the status of bank swallows in California, and the significance of the Funston habitat as it relates to the other habitat areas.

Please highlight DFG's supporting position for additional protection (specifically fencing to exclude people and dogs from the cliff edge) for FOFU bank swallow habitat. Please note your thought as to why this would be important for the overall protection of this species.

Please provide your opinion and interpretation about the impacts of people and dogs on the cliff's edge, and cliff rescues of the bank swallows

Please re-iterate DF&F's opinion that disturbance (from recreational pressure on the beach?) most likely resulted in the shift in bank swallow habitat to use the higher cliffs to the south, but increased potential at this site for disturbance from above and from people climbing the cliff face

Please provide a recommendation that if we do not take action we may lose the entire Colony, which has declined from approx 700 burrows in 1997 to less than 150 in 1998 and 1999, as a result of recreational impacts.

Thanks for your support

Sharon

Please address the letter to
Brian O'Neill
Superintendent
GGNRA, Building 201
Fort Mason, SF, CA 94123

(A.R. US06939, email from S. Farrell to R. Schlorff, Oct. 27, 1999). A few days later, on November 1, 1999, the park staff briefed the San Francisco Committee of the GGNRA Commission about the need to protect the bank-swallow habitat through closure of a portion of the bluffs (A.R. US04641-44).

         8.         Reaction of the Dog Walkers

         Although the National Park Service had obtained funding for the closure in the summer of 1999 and had originally intended to go forward with the project in the fall of 1999, it was not until December 3, 1999, that the National Park Service informed the Ft. Funston Dog Walkers of their plan, albeit in an indirect way. The topic came up during a so-called walk-through. Walk­through is the term used by the dog walkers and the National Park Service to refer to on-site discussions about park issues. The dog-owner representatives did not know that the walk­through would include a discussion of closures. Instead, they expected to discuss the usual issues such as a dog water fountain on the Coastal Trail, boxes for plastic bags to pick up after dogs, and the locations of several trash cans. During the walk-through, Ranger Chris Powell volunteered that there was a possibility that a further closure south of the 1995 closure might be made for bank-swallow protection and revegetation (A.R. US06200).

         On December 21, 1999, Ranger Roger Scott, a public relations staff member, emailed Ms. McKay a set of minutes purportedly summarizing the walk-through. As stated, Ms. McKay is an organizer of the Ft. Funston Dog Walkers. The minutes stated that "Chris Powell began discussion with the group the very likely possibility that a six-acre cliff area might be restricted from access because of a Bank Swallow relocation and ongoing revegetation project" (A.R. US06200). This statement was more definite than had been the casual and hypothetical conversation during the walk-through. Ms. McKay was surprised by the minutes. She had not understood that the National Park Service was planning to close six acres of property between the beach and the Coastal Trail. She so informed Ranger Kevin Turner, the head ranger and an interpretive specialist, who then sent the following email to a fellow ranger:

While I was on a rove at Fort Funston yesterday (12/26), I bumped into Linda McKay of the Fort Funston Dog Walkers Association. She asked me to clarify something regarding the minutes Roger Scott had sent her from the meeting we all had been at on 12/3.
The notes contained a reference to a 5 acre closure for the expansion of the bank swallow site, and Linda wanted to know what the boundaries were going to be. When I explained they were going to be from the existing bank swallow site to the existing trail leading from the "Y" to the beach, she got a very perplexed look on her face and walked away muttering "This has nothing to do with the bank swallows, then."

I am afraid that maybe we didn't make the boundaries too clear to her at the meeting earlier this month ... and I am afraid we will be needing to perform LOTS of educational roves in the near future on this issue.

Kevin

(A.R. US06197, email from R. Weideman to M. Scott, C. Powell, R. Scott, and Y. Ruan, Dec. 28, 1999, forwarding email from K. Turner to R. Weideman, Dec. 27, 1999). The day after her meeting with Ranger Turner, Ms. McKay wrote the following email to Rangers Fortmann and Scott regarding problems with the minutes from the December 3 walk-through:

 

Roger/Tracy

The minutes are substantially correct with the exception of the 5 acre closing. I think we're going to have to agree to disagree on this issue - it may have been raised in the walkthrough, but none of us understood that GGNRA is proposing closing the beach side from the trail to the beach all the way north to the current bank swallow flyover.

If this is the case, please be prepared for a huge outcry. Hundreds of people play on both dunes, hundreds more walk through the valley between the dunes and flyover. It's a great place to run dogs down the hills, especially when the tide is too high for a beach walk.

Since no one knows for sure why the bank swallows moved their nest south, why is the GGNRA responding by closing off the cliffs above the nests? They moved from an area that was protected. Is there any evidence at all that this closure is going to make a bit of difference? I could understand the intention better if the GGNRA proposed fencing off a narrow strip above the nests to people didn't peer over - although I would argue that his has no effect on the number of birds making a nest. But - proposing to close the entire area makes no sense unless, as most of our members believe, it is the long term goal of GGNRA to turn Fort Funston into a natural sanctuary and not keep it as an urban park

I'll call one of you after the new year so we can discuss this. I'd hate to raise this issue and get everyone upset if I've misunderstood your minutes.

Rgds

Linda

(A.R. US06197, email from L. McKay to T. Fortmann and R. Scoff, Dec. 27,1999) (emphasis added). Later, the actual size of the closure proved to be almost ten acres, not five or six acres as the minutes suggested.

         The walk-through minutes mentioned that closure was to be on the agenda at the January Advisory Committee meeting; however, the dog walkers contend that they did not get notice of the meeting until January 14, 2000, four days before the meeting (A.R. US060200, Dec. 3 Committee Meeting Minutes). When the dog walkers did get a copy of the agenda, the closure was not listed as a public-discussion item. On January 15, 2000, Ms. McKay sent an email entitled "Fort Funston Crisis" to members of Ft. Funston Dogwalkers, informing them of the meeting and the bank-swallow closure issue. The email called on members to attend the meeting: "We need bodies there, even though we may not be able to comment -- but have comments ready if we can!" (email from L. McKay to Ft. Funston Dog Walkers, Jan. 15, 2000).

         The Advisory Committee Meeting occurred on January 18, 2000 (A.R. US06150). Ranger Farrell, a National Park Service plant biologist, and Ranger Hatch, a National Park Service wildlife specialist, gave a slide presentation to illustrate the four objectives of the project: to protect the threatened bank-swallow colony at Fort Funston; to stabilize eroding inland dunes and increase biological diversity by restoring the coastal dune habitat; to increase public safety by reducing visitor exposure to imminent threats; and to protect geologic and historic coastal features from human-induced erosion (A.R. US06151). The meeting was open to the public. Dog walkers, as well as other members of the public, attended and were allowed to speak. Of the thirteen members of the public who spoke, seven were dog owners (ibid.).

         During this period, as before, officials were very aware of the possibility that the dog walkers would wish to be heard and sought to preclude or minimize such input. In this vein, Assistant Superintendent Mary Gibson Scott wrote the following in an email on January 24 with the subject line "Ft. Funston dogwalkers and attachment":

Regarding the meetings with dog reps, I want to keep it as small as possible - existing organizations such as SF dog and SPCA, maybe humane society. Otherwise we are asking for them to organize their constituency even further than they already are. "Why would we provide a forum, i.e. meeting with 'dog walkers' with regularity for them to beat us up?"
A.R. US06268, email from M. Scott to D. Mannel, J. Scheumann, Y. Ruan, and T. Thomas and copied to R. Scott, T. Fortmann, M. Bartling, dated Jan. 24, 2000) (emphasis added). The email was in response to an email from Ranger Roger Scott summarizing a recent meeting with the Ft. Funston Dog Walkers.

As I have indicated on my messages we have completed the public process for the project (perhaps one of the more contentious ones) and are ready to start. The project involves the installation of approximately 1,750 linear feet of fencing using the same template/construction design as was used at Crissy Field to protect the dunes. The materials are peeler posts, wire mesh, cable and cable clamps and u-nails to attach the mesh to the fence posts.

 

The project is to protect the state threatened bank swallow species and involves closing 5.8 acres of Fort Funston (much to some of the dog walkers dismay - however will have significant benefit to the swallow). The fence is installed along the coastal trail and is in sand - just like Crissy. There are two areas where the construction will require some thought as the terrain is pretty rough.

 

The project is probably in the top 10% of the park's most visible projects therefore I have hired a staffperson to work with the public/crew the duration of the project - similar to how we did the tree removal project at Inspiration Point. Brian wants to ensure that we are in and out as quickly and professionally as possible, so if we can have an experienced crew it will probably save us both headaches in the long run. The crew will need to work continuously and consistently for the duration of the project.

 

James felt that the project was reasonable in the timeframe given so I want to confirm with you that this is feasible - we have had some challenges in the past with underestimation of resources and I want to ensure that it is not the case in the project. What I would like to propose is that if the crew finishes earlier than the contract calls for then we pay you the balance in full - the project is that political. However, on the flip side, after your review we will need the guarantee that the project can be accomplished in the time that we agree upon, and with the resources provided.

A.R. US04208-09, email from S. Farrell to J. Gomes, Jan. 26, 2000, copied to M. Petrilli) (emphasis added)

         9.         The Demand For Public Input and Rebuff

         By early February, the dog owners requested a written record of the public involvement in the National Park Service's decision to close more of the coastal bluffs. These requests triggered a search within the National Park Service for documentation of any public hearings, as reflected by the following series of emails between Michael Feinstein, Ranger Farrell, and Ranger Fortmann:

Daphne and Sharon:

The dog owners have been calling me and requesting a written record of public involvement in the decision to limit access to areas of Fort Funston where we will be protecting bank swallow habitat. During your presentation at the Advisory Commission in January, you said there were public meetings in 1996. 1 looked through the minutes of the Advisory Commission meetings and did not find any reference to this issue in 1996. Were you referring to workshops or neighborhood meetings, and do you have a written record of these meetings?

The dog walkers are claiming we are not giving them adequate notice and a chance for public input on this issue.

Please let me know if you have anything in your files showing public meetings.

Michael

(A.R. US06261-62, email from M. Feinstein to D. Hatch and S. Farrell, Feb. 10, 2000). In response to Michael Feinstein's email, Ranger Farrell replied that she had not referred to public meetings in 1996:

Hi Michael - I am a little confused as to our inference during the Adv. Comm. Presentation about public meetings in 1996. 1 stated that we met with the SF advisory commission in November 1999, but made no other comments about public meetings. I did however contact Mary Petrilli after our phone conversation and she has the original project review for the 1992 Bank Swallow project and will fax it to me this week - I will forward to you - Sharon

(A.R. US06261, email from S. Farrell to M. Feinstein, Feb. 14, 2000). After Michael Feinstein reviewed Ranger Farrell's email, he forwarded it to Ranger Fortmann, expressing doubt that any public hearing ever took place:
Tracy,

FYI, please read Sharon's note to me. I don't think there was any public meeting with public comment on the Bank Swallows issue.

(Ibid., email from M. Feinstein to T. Fortmann, Feb. 14, 2000). Ranger Fortmann then forwarded the foregoing emails to Ranger Roger Scott, asking what Ms. McKay had requested:

Rog: You've been talking with Linda - what has she asked for and did she relate it to the commission presentation!?! I thought she had.

taf

(Ibid., email from T. Fortmann to R. Scott, Feb. 14, 2000). Ranger Roger Scott then wrote an email to Assistant Superintendent Mary Gibson Scott, Ranger Fortmann, and Michael Feinstein, concluding that there had been no formal notice or hearing before the 1995 closure. Ranger Roger Scott recommended that the National Park Service take the position that no notice or hearing had been necessary as follows:

TAF/Mike

Mary - FYI

Linda has been asking what public involvement drove the current bank swallow closure.

In earlier conversation I have had with park staff, I was told that this closure is an addition to original closure that the advisory commission had previously approved. That was the wording at the Nov SF committee meeting when they were told about the current closure, so that the issue would be only an update for the Jan Advisory Meeting.

Since then, after reading the project review statements and Mike's documenting the lack of any formal input at any advisory meeting going back to 1997, I believe there was no formal notification of the closure of the area to protect bank swallows or to exclude dogs and that if anything happened it was at the Fort Funston site level.

*       *       *

There was some language in the 1996 bank swallow plan that talked about outreach to dogwalkers and public education, but I can't find any documentation that it actually happened.

Ultimately, I think we have to say that there was no requirement for official public input as this was consistent with the GMP and did not involve NEPA. It would have been a courtesy to reach out to the dog walkers regarding this change and we may have done so to some degree.

Regarding the current closure, we do have outreach beginning as of today, Feb 15 where we have a term position on site handing out information. We met with Ft Funston interp staff last week to talk about how to approach and interface with users on this subject. We will have been out there a week talking about the closure before the fence begins to be installed and will be out here the entire three weeks it will take to put in the fence, so I think we can say that we are doing outreach now. It was also in the last Ft Funston Dog Walker's newsletter.

Bottom line, when media gets involved they will claim we did not include them in the decision making process and even if it is not required by law, it will be "big brother" against the little man. Still, the best plan is to keep working on relations with the dog walkers and to be responsive to their issues, even if we are not in favor of them.

(A.R. US06260, email from R. Scott to M. Scott, T. Fortmann, and M. Feinstein, Feb. 15, 2000) (emphasis added). According to Ranger Roger Scott's email, outreach staff would be on hand one week prior to commencement of the fences and all through the fence building. The outreach was not for the purpose of receiving input on the closure itself. That was a fait accompli. The outreach was a public-relations campaign to sell the closure and to create the appearance that the National Park Service wanted the public's input. General Superintendent Brian O'Neill and Assistant Superintendent Mary Gibson Scott met with representatives of the dog-walking community on February 17, 2000, to discuss their concerns. Fencing began a few days later, as planned, on February 22, 2000.

         On February 25, 2000, Lydia Boesch, counsel for plaintiffs, faxed a letter to Ranger Fortmann stating that the recreational users of Fort Funston were considering applying for a temporary restraining order to prevent the closure. The letter requested the results of all public use surveys completed in the preceding three years at Fort Funston. Ranger Roger Scott is quoted in a March 1, 2000, newspaper article as saying "[w]e knew this was not going to be a popular thing" (A.R. US06113, Marianne Constantinou, "Dog Owners Snarl At Fences," S.F. Exam., Mar. 1, 2000 at A-1, A-8). Ranger Roger Scott admitted in his deposition that he made this statement.

         On March 3, 2000, after plaintiffs expressly threatened this lawsuit, Assistant Superintendent Mary Gibson Scott wrote a memorandum on which the subject line read "Justification for Closure of Bank Swallow Habitat and Stabilization/Revegetation of Eroding Dunes - Fort Funston" (A.R. US06615-23, mem., Mar. 3, 2000, signed by M. Scott, initialed by B. O'Neill). The memorandum began by citing to the requirements of Chapter 36, Sections 1.5(c) and 1.7 of the Code of Federal Regulations: "[t]his memorandum fulfills the requirement of 36 CFR section 1.5, closures and public use limits for the above referenced actions (A.R. US06615). It also documents the public notice required under 36 CFR section 1.7 in support of the closure" (ibid.). The memorandum "serve[d] as a determination that closure of the subject area [was] necessary for the protection of natural resources and public safety, and implementation of management policies, and no less restrictive measures would suffice" (id. at US06617). The National Park Service never prepared any memorandum analyzing whether the closure would be controversial or highly controversial or whether the closure would significantly alter the public use pattern of Fort Funston.

         10.         Procedural History          

The fences were built between February 22 and mid-March, 2000. On March 13, 2000, plaintiffs simultaneously filed a complaint for injunctive relief and applied for a temporary restraining order preventing the National Park Service from closing off the designated permanent and seasonal closure areas. On March 14, 2000, the Court held a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order. The Court granted plaintiffs' application in limited part, allowing the permanent closure to remain closed, but enjoining the National Park Service from closing the seasonal area barring an emergency under 36 C.F.R. 1.5(b). On April 11, the Court visited Fort Funston, accompanied by the parties and their counsel. On April 12, the National Park Service reported to the Court that the bank swallows had returned. The National Park Service declared an emergency and closed off the seasonal area. On April 14, the Court held a hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, which this order now addresses.

ANALYSIS

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show either (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor." Rucker v. Davis, 203 F.3d 627, 634 (91h Cir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). "These are not two tests, but rather the opposite ends of a single continuum in which the required showing of harm varies inversely with the required showing of meritoriousness." Republic of the Philippines V. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

         A strong showing of entitlement to a preliminary injunction is required where the moving party seeks to enjoin governmental action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme. In such cases, the moving party must establish both irreparable injury and a probability of success on the merits. NAACP, Inc. v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1995). But the lower preliminary injunction standard may be applied where there are public interest concerns on both sides. Time Warner Cable of New York City v. Bloomberg L.P., 118 F.3d 917, 923 (2d Cir. 1997). As seen below, the outcome is the same under either the higher or lower standard in this case.

         1.         Likelihood of Success on the Merits and/or Serious Questions

         A.        Standard of Review

         Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a reviewing court must hold unlawful and set aside an agency action found to be "without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C. 706. The issue in this case is whether defendants violated the National Park Service regulation requiring publication in the Federal Register, absent an emergency, for a "highly controversial" closure or a closure that substantially alters public use patterns. As stated, the. relevant regulation provides as follows:

Except in emergency situations, a closure, designation, use or activity restriction or condition, or the termination or relaxation of such, which is of a nature, magnitude and duration that will result in a significant alteration in the public use pattern of the park area, adversely affect the park's natural, aesthetic, scenic or cultural values, require a long-term or significant modification in the resource management objectives of the unit, or is of a highly controversial nature, shall be published as rulemaking in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

36 C.F.R. 1.5(b). The National Park Service did not publish the 2000 Fort Funston closure as rulemaking in the Federal Register. Thus, if the closure was either "highly controversial" or involved a "significant alteration," the regulation was violated.

        The government argues that the National Park Service made an implicit decision, as evidenced by the lack of a published proposed rule, that the closure was neither of a "highly controversial nature" nor a "significant alteration in the public use pattern." That implicit decision, the government argues, is entitled to deference. According to the government, plaintiffs can prevail only if this implicit decision was arbitrary and capricious based on the administrative record. The Court disagrees.

         While an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is normally given substantial deference by courts, post-hoc rationalizations are entitled to little or no deference, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) ("It is well-established that an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself "). In this case, there was no contemporaneous interpretation whether the closure was "highly controversial" or a "substantial alteration of the public use pattern" before the National Park Service made its decision to put up the fences. Before the fencing began and before plaintiffs sent a letter about seeking an injunction, the National Park Service did not prepare a written determination explaining that the closure was neither "highly controversial" nor a "significant alteration in the public use pattern."

         In addition, the administrative record is replete with evidence that the National Park Service was aware the closure would be highly controversial. As far back as 1995, the National Park Service knew that such closures were strongly opposed by the dog walkers. In 1999, Mary Petrilli cautioned fellow rangers "we do not want this to blow up in our faces" and "[e]veryone copied on this should be very discreet with this information, PLEASE" (A.R. US06293, email from M. Petrilli to C. Powell, July 31, 1999). Assistant Superintendent Mary Gibson Scott indicated that any meetings with the dog walkers should be kept small, so as not to facilitate their further organization by providing them a forum (A.R. US06268, email from M. Scott to D. Mannel, J. Scheumann, Y. Ruan, and T. Thomas and copied to R. Scott, T. Fortmann, M. Bartling, dated Jan. 24, 2000). In organizing the fence-building, Ranger Farrell referred to the closure as "perhaps one of the more contentious" projects, predicted that the closure would be "much to some of the dog walkers dismay," characterized the closure as being "in the top 10% of the park's most visible projects," and proposed to pay the balance in full if the crew finished earlier than the contract called for because "the project is that political" (A.R. US04208-09, email from S. Farrell to J. Gomes, Jan. 26, 2000, copied to M. Petrilli). After the fences started to go up, Roger Scott admitted to a reporter "[w]e knew this was not going to be a popular thing" (A.R. US06113, Marianne Constantinou, "Dog Owners Snarl At Fences," S.F. Exam., Mar. 1, 2000 at A-1, A-8) (quoting Roger Scott). Ranger Scott admitted under oath that he made this statement. The National Park Service did not solicit the views of the dog walkers during the decision-making process. Instead, the National Park Service solicited the views of only select groups in favor of the closure, like the California Department of Fish and Wildlife.

         Now, after the fact, after litigation has commenced, Assistant Superintendent Mary Gibson Scott has submitted a declaration stating that she determined at the time of the justification memorandum that the closure would be neither highly controversial nor a significant alteration in the public use of the land. This declaration is, of course, outside the administrative record. Regardless, the declaration is of limited value. First, it is not contemporaneous, and likely not as reliable as a document drafted at the time the decision was made. Second, even at the time Assistant Superintendent Scott made the Section 1.5(b) decisions regarding "highly controversial" and "significant alteration," plaintiffs had already. threatened litigation, so the undocumented analysis was made in contemplation of litigation. Third, Assistant Superintendent Scott's declaration regarding her interactions with the dog walkers is at odds with the contemporaneous evidence. In her declaration, she states that she believed the dog walkers had no on-going concerns about the closure:

On February 17, 2000, 1 personally met with Lydia Boesch, Lindsay Kefauver and Anne Farrow, representatives of the off leash dog walker groups and individuals, to discuss their concerns and further discuss the basis of the closures. I also explained that a Park Service regulation prohibited pets off leash in national park areas (36 C.F.R. Section 2.15) and that the park has an obligation to protect sensitive resources, such as the dunes and the bank swallows. This meeting went well, and within a few days, we received correspondence from both Ms. Farrow and Ms. Kefauver expressing their satisfaction with our meeting. They expressed no on-going concerns about the closure or requests for changes in the closure in that correspondence. True and accurate copies of this correspondence are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B (US06570 and US06125-26), respectively. None of my interactions with this group caused me to conclude that this small closure was highly controversial in nature.

(3d Scott Decl., Par.12). This statement is at odds with several parts of the record. First, less than a month before, Assistant Superintendent Scott instructed National Park Service staff not to encourage communication with the dog walkers:

Regarding the meetings with dog reps, I want to keep it as small as possible - existing. organizations such as SF dog and SPCA, maybe humane society. Otherwise we are asking for them to organize their constituency even further than they already are. Why would we provide a forum, i.e. meeting with 'dog walkers' with regularity for them to beat us up?

(A.R. US06268, email from M. Scott to D. Mannel, J. Scheumann, Y. Ruan, and T. Thomas and copied to R. Scott, T. Fortmann, M. Bartling, dated Jan. 24, 2000). In addition, between the February 17 meeting and Assistant Superintendent Scott's March 3 justification memorandum, the dog walkers were actively opposing the closure. On February 25, counsel for plaintiffs faxed a letter to Ranger Fortmann stating that the recreational users of Fort Funston were considering applying for a temporary restraining order to prevent the closure. On March 1, a front-page story in the San Francisco Examiner quoted angry comments from dog walkers and noted that the dog walkers were going to seek an injunction. In that same article, Ranger Roger Scott admitted that "[w]e knew this was not going to be a popular thing," a statement he acknowledged under oath.

         The letters appended to Assistant Superintendent Mary Gibson Scott's declaration as Exhibits A and B, while pleasant in tone, did not suggest that the dog walkers were satisfied with the closure. In Exhibit A, Lindsay Kefauver thanked Assistant Superintendent Scott for meeting with the dog walkers and expressed hope that the National Park Service and the dog walkers would continue to talk about preserving off-leash privileges at Fort Funston:

We look forward to continuing to work with all of you to keep Ft. Funston a welcoming and successful park for all of the multi-use­use demands placed on it - especially our off-leash dog privileges. We hope that it feels beneficial to you to include us in your discussions and informed [sic] of decisions that effect Ft. Funston.

As you know the Ft. Funston Dog Walkers are having a meeting next week on Tuesday, Feb. 29th at 7 PM at the Ranger's station to discuss some Dog Walkers business and hope to have someone from GGNRA speak to us about the changes taking place at the Fort.

(3d Scott Decl., 12, Exh. A, ltr. from L. Kefauver to M. Scott, Feb. 22, 2000). In Exhibit B, Anne Farrow expressed concern that the Ft. Funston Dog Walkers be a part of decisions concerning the park:

Please let me know who will be the GGNRA representative at our February 29 (7 pm) meeting as soon as possible. We need to be sure our clean-ups are organized for the next several months and be sure we are informed of and part of decisions affecting Fort Funston.

(3d Scott Decl., Par. 12, Exh. B, ltr. from A. Farrow to T. Fortmann, Feb. 22, 2000). Both letters reminded that there would be a Ft. Funston Dog Walkers meeting on February 29, and requested that a GGNRA representative be present.

         The National Park Service regulations do not require a contemporaneous written determination on "highly controversial" or "substantial alteration in the public use pattern." See 36 C.F.R. 1.5(b). The Court does not herein mean to suggest that such a requirement exists. Where, however, the administrative record shows a heated controversy and a change in the public-use pattern, an after-the-fact declaration outside the administrative record claiming an official thought about (but did not document) whether publication was required is not persuasive, particularly when it appears from the declaration that the decision was made after the threat of litigation.

         B.        Evidence Outside the Administrative Record

         Defendants have objected to plaintiffs' submission of evidence outside the administrative record. While defendants concede that such evidence may be taken into consideration in connection with plaintiffs' claim of irreparable harm, they argue that such evidence should not be considered in the Court's evaluation of plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits. Defendants are correct that a court's review of an agency's decision is usually restricted to the evidence in the administrative record. 5 U.S.C. 701-706. In this context, the rule is problematic, given the National Park Service's studied solicitation of one-sided input and its "discreet" avoidance of the dog walkers. Defendants would have the Court determine, for example, whether the closure was "highly controversial" based on a deck stacked against the dog walkers. That having been said, the fact remains that most of the evidence relied on herein is, in fact, contained in the administrative record and the Court would reach the same result based on the administrative record alone. That record shows the lengths to which the closure architects went in suppressing input. Because the administrative record is skewed, however, the Court has considered extrinsic evidence.

 

         C.         Highly Controversial Nature

         Only one decision even refers to the "highly controversial nature" phrase in Section 1.5(b). In Henderson v. Stanton, 76 F.Supp.2d 10 (D. D.C. 1999), the plaintiffs challenged a National Park Service regulation barring sales of message-bearing T-shirts on federal parkland in National Capital Region. One of the plaintiffs' arguments was that the definition of "sales" was subject to rulemaking because it was "of a highly controversial nature." Id. at 16 n.3. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the definition of "sales" had appeared in the preamble to a final rule that had already been published for notice and comment. Ibid. The court held that it need not be submitted again and did not construe "highly controversial."

         Important guidance comes from the history of the regulation itself. The "highly controversial nature" standard was not included in the regulation as originally proposed. 47 Fed.Reg. 11612. 'It was inserted in the final rule to address the concerns of commenters that park superintendents could be "arbitrary and excessive in implementing closures.". 48 Fed. Reg. 30254. The commentary to the final publication of 36 C.F.R. 1.5, however, emphasized that public comment and notice were not meant to apply to closures made to achieve routine resource management objectives:                                   

A permanent closure of a limited area within a park does not require the use of notice and comment procedures, unless it also has the effect of significantly altering or disrupting use by a substantial number of park visitors .... Public notice and comment is not intended to apply to measures taken to achieve routine resource management objectives, such as construction, facility maintenance or rehabilitation, and routine practices which are aimed at preserving the viability, integrity and natural character of the park ecosystem.

48 Fed. Reg. 30,252, 30,261-62 (June 30, 1983). The present case does not involve construction or facility maintenance. Only a small portion of the closed land is being rehabilitated. The closure is aimed at preserving the viability of the park ecosystem insofar as bank swallows and vegetation are concerned, but the closure cannot be characterized as a "routine practice."

         The phrase "highly controversial" arises under regulations under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), codified at 42 U.S.C. 4332. Under the NEPA, the government must perform an "intensity analysis" in determining whether an environmental impact statement is required. One criterion for an intensity analysis is the "degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial." 40 C.F.R. 1508.27(b)(4). In this context, the term "highly controversial" refers to instances in which "a substantial dispute exists as to its size, nature, or effect of the major federal action rather than to the existence of opposition to a use." Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dept. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1182 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation and emphasis omitted).

         Opposition to a project does not necessarily require an environmental impact statement. See, e.g., West Houston Air Comm. v. F.A.A., 784 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1986). "The existence of a disagreement as to whether an EIS should be commissioned is not by itself grounds for a court to require an EIS. " Roanoke River Basin Assoc. v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58, 64 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992). "Otherwise, opposition, and not the reasoned analysis set forth in an environmental assessment, would determine whether an environmental impact statement would have to be prepared. The outcome would be governed by a 'heckler's veto."' North Carolina v. Federal Aviation Admin., 957 F.2d 1125, 1133-1134 (4th Cir.1992) (citations omitted).

         A substantial difference exists, however, between the NEPA and the regulation at issue. Under the NEPA, the ultimate issue is whether the agency action will have a significant enough impact that the scientific and engineering study necessary for an EIS should be required. Under the regulation at issue, the ultimate issue is whether the public should be allowed their say before a closure. In the latter context, the more controversial a proposal in the classic sense of strongly­divided public opinion, the more appropriate is an opportunity for public input, so that the decision-maker has the benefit of all views and advice. The input may not stop a project, but it may revise and improve it. Here, for example, plaintiffs claim to support protection of the cliffs and swallows but question the need to close areas well away from the cliffs, wish to submit suggestions for re-routing the fences, and want to keep the middle access to the beach open.

         If the National Park Service had any internal bulletin or field guidance interpreting "highly controversial nature," the Court would defer to it. See Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580-581 (1942) ("While the interpretative bulletins are not issued as regulations under statutory authority, they do carry persuasiveness as an expression of the view of those experienced in the administration of the Act and acting with the advice of a staff specializing in its interpretation and application."). The National Park Service, however, has provided only a post-hoc interpretation (outside the administrative record) generated after plaintiffs threatened to sue. The Court is left to define "highly controversial."

         To begin with, the Court agrees with the government that newspaper coverage of the closure, after the decision was made, is not proper evidence that the closure was "highly , controversial." Whether the closure was "highly controversial," must be determined based. on the evidence available to the National Park Service at the time the decision was made. After-the-fact press coverage could not have been considered by the agency and is subject to manipulation. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the closure was of a "highly controversial nature" based on the following.

         First, the administrative record is replete with recognition that the closures had been and would be contentious. The dog walkers were known to be a significant and longstanding user of Fort Funston. The previous Fort Funston closure had been controversial, so much so that in 1995, the National Park Service promised the dog walkers that no further bank-swallow closure would be made. Specifically, Brian O'Neill, the General Superintendent of the GGNRA. wrote:

Ranger Milestone showed you two areas, Battery Davis' hill slope erosion control project and the Bank Swallow critical habitat, both are management concerns. The swallow habitat restoration area is nearing its completion and will not be expanded southward. To protect the newly restored habitat, pets will be required on leash while passing through the Bank Swallow trial system.

(A.R. US06438-39, ltr. from Gen. Superintendent O'Neill to R. Avanzino, Mar. 15, 1995) (emphasis added). There was pervasive recognition within the National Park Service that the new closure would be controversial, evidenced by the following remarks:

"However, we do not want this to blow up in our faces and need to come up with a plan with a timeline on it" (A.R. US06293, email from M. Petrilli to C. Powell, July 31, 1999).

"**NOTE: Everyone copied on this should be very discreet with this information, PLEASE" (ibid ).

"Regarding the meetings with dog reps, I want to keep it as small as possible - existing organizations such as SF dog and SPCA, maybe humane society. Otherwise we are asking for them to organize their constituency even further than they already are. Why would we provide a forum, i.e. meeting with 'dog walkers' with regularity for them to beat us up?" (A.R. US06268, email from M. Scott to D. Mannel, J. Scheumann, Y. Ruan, and T. Thomas and copied to R. Scott, T. Fortmann, M. Bartling, dated Jan. 24, 2000).

"As I have indicated on my messages we have completed the public process for the project (perhaps one of the more contentious ones) and are ready to start" (A.R. US04208­09, email from S. Farrell to J. Gomes, Jan. 26, 2000, copied to M. Petrilli).

"The project is to protect the state threatened bank swallow species and involves closing 5.8 acres of Fort Funston (much to some of the dog walkers dismay - however will have significant benefit to the swallow) (ibid.).

"The project is probably in the top 10% of the park's most visible projects therefore I have hired a staff person to work with the public/crew for the duration of the project - similar to how we did the tree removal project at Inspiration Point. Brian wants to ensure that we are in and out as quickly and professionally as possible, so if we can have an experienced crew it will probably save us both headaches in the long run. The crew will need to work continuously and consistently for the duration of the project" (ibid.).

"What I would like to propose is that if the crew finishes earlier than the contract calls for then we pay you the balance in full - the project is that political" (ibid.).

"We knew this was not going to be a popular thing" (A.R. US06113, Marianne Constantinou, "Dog Owners Snarl At Fences," S.F. Exam., Mar. 1, 2000 at A-1, A-8) (quoting Roger Scott). Roger Scott admitted in his deposition that he made this statement.

These excerpts show an intent on the part of the National Park Service to railroad through the closure, to maintain secrecy, to unleash the fencing with lightening speed, and to establish a fait accompli.

 

         Second, contrary to the government's argument the closure affected a significant and strategically located parcel. The ten-acre closure should be viewed in terms of the 220 acres of Fort Funston, not the larger GGNRA. Otherwise, a closure within a multi-site park could never be considered of a "highly controversial nature." The closure must be considered in conjunction with the previous closure of the same type; otherwise, piecemeal closures could never be challenged even though large in overall scope. This parcel is especially significant. The closure encompasses beach-front land with important beach access and large sand dunes on which people exercise and play with their dogs. Put differently, plaintiffs are able to articulate objectively plausible issues about the closure that explain why the closure is legitimately highly controversial. It is a project whose details might well be modified by public input even if it goes forward.

         D.        Substantial Alteration in Public Use Patterns

         

         Two decisions have discussed the term "significant alteration in the public use pattern." In Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 1997), the snowmobilers sought to enjoin the National Park Service from enforcing restrictions on snowmobiling in Voyageurs National Park. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the restriction should have been published in the Federal Register under Section 1.5(b) because it would result in "a significant alteration in the public use pattern." The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument. Snowmobiling in Voyageurs National Park was already generally prohibited absent special regulations permitting the activity. Id. at 669 n.10. The court reasoned that although the National Park Service had neglected to enforce the provision and had allowed snowmobiling to continue despite regulations to the contrary, the challenged closure order restricting snowmobiling did not amount to a "significant alteration" in what was previously an unlawful public use of the park. Ibid.

 

         In Spiegel v. Babbitt, 855 F.Supp. 402 (D. D.C. 1994), the court held that the National Park Service's decision to limit mooring hours in Georgetown Waterfront Park did not create a "significant alteration in the public use pattern." Without lengthy analysis, the court concluded that plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary were not sufficient to outweigh the deference a court normally grants to an agency decision. In Spiegel, the National Park Service had a written a letter to the plaintiff explaining that its limited docking restriction did not constitute a significant alteration of public use warranting publication in the Federal Register. Id. at 404. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this portion of the district court's order. Spiegel V. Babbitt, 56 F.3d 1531, No. 94-5184, 1995 WL 364555, *1 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 1995).

 

         Here, however, walking dogs off-leash in Fort Funston was expressly permitted (A.R. US01472, GGNRA, 36 C.F.R. 1, Compendium Amend., signed on July 8,1996, by Brian O'Neill, Gen. Superintendent). Thus, Fort Funston had the reverse scheme from Mausolf, which required special regulations to allow snowmobiling. The National Park Service's closure of the coastal bluff area was not simply enforcement of existing law. Likewise, this case differs significantly from Spiegel. There the court's decision rested solely on deference to the National Park Service, which had memorialized its decision that its restriction did not significantly alter the public use pattern in a letter. Here, as discussed above, deference to the National Park Service is not appropriate.

 

         Comments to the "significant alteration" language in Section 1.5(b) provide:

A permanent closure of a limited area within a park does not require the use of notice and comment procedures, unless it also has the required effect of significantly altering or disrupting use by a substantial number of park visitors. In this connection, it should be noted that a particular closure or restriction in a small park unit may require rulemaking, even though it would not if applied in a park with a different pattern.

47 Fed. Reg. 11599-11600.

         The record shows that the closure restricts the last large bluff area of Fort Funston. The closure eliminates the central one of only three access points to the beach. This elimination also poses a potential safety hazard for people on the beach during high tide. Hikers trying to go between the northern and southern access trails may get trapped in the surf. The obvious and logical escape route is the middle draw. That, however, would be barred by the closure. Hikers might be tempted to climb over a rock outcrop at Panama Point, an unsafe endeavor for most.6

         The record contains no statistical analysis of use patterns or surveys of users on this issue. Plaintiffs have shown some evidence outside the administrative record regarding use, but much of this is hearsay. In any event, anecdotal evidence is of limited value. But, again, the National Park Service prepared no contemporaneous memorandum explaining that the closure would not significantly alter the public use pattern of Fort Funston. The Court conducted a view of the site. Based on the topography and location of the closure, the Court finds that plaintiffs have raised, at a minimum, serious questions regarding whether the National Park Service's closure will create a "significant alteration in the public use pattern.

         E.        Conclusion Re Likelihood of Success

         

         Without doubt, the National Park Service is authorized to manage Fort Funston so as to preserve its natural resources, including closures to protect the bank swallows. The extent to which all or any part of Fort Funston should be closed for that worthwhile purpose is committed to the sound discretion of the National Park Service. A court could set aside such a substantive judgment only if it were arbitrary and capricious so long as all procedural requirements were followed. In this case, a procedural rule was violated, or at least a likelihood of such a violation has been shown.

 

         2.         Irreparable Injury and/or Balance of Hardships

 

         Plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or equitable remedy following trial. The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from such harm." Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992). The deprivation of a source of personal satisfaction and tremendous joy can constitute an irreparable injury. See Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir.1988) (possibility of irreparable injury established where school board sought to remove teacher diagnosed with AIDS from teaching hearing-impaired children but continued to pay his salary).

 

         In Galusha v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, the court found that the plaintiffs, people with disabilities requiring motorized vehicles for mobility, would be irreparably harmed by enforcement of regulations prohibiting any non-emergency use of motorized vehicles within Adirondack Park. 27 F.Supp.2d 117, 122 (N.D. N.Y. 1998). The court reasoned that every day the plaintiffs missed in the park constituted irreparable harm because no amount of money could compensate for the loss. The court further found that "[p]laintiffs' access to a naturally ever-changing environment is impermissibly limited" and "[a]bsent preliminary relief, they will suffer an injury that is present, actual, and not calculable." Ibid. This Court finds the Galusha reasoning sound.

 

         Like the Galusha plaintiffs, plaintiffs in this case have shown the possibility of irreparable harm. Members of the plaintiff groups and the individual plaintiffs used the closure area frequently - some walked their dogs there twice daily. Plaintiffs do not seek money damages in this action. Rather, they seek continued access to recreation that improves the quality of their lives. The harm they face is substantial and irreparable.

 

         Moreover, the balance of hardships favors plaintiffs. Where there is a strong probability of success on the merits, as here on the issue of "highly controversial," the moving party need only demonstrate that he or she will suffer a degree of hardship that outweighs the hardship facing the opposing party. See Topanga Press, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 989 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993). Defendants would not be hamstrung by an injunction pending a trial on the merits. Defendants need only publish the closure as rulemaking, take written comments, and then make a decision. Moreover, as seen by recent events, the National Park Service has the authority to make any closure pursuant to an emergency. When the bank swallows returned, defendants did so. As for the National Park Service's planned revegetation efforts, defendants have offered no evidence of irreparable harm if the closure does not take effect immediately. Indeed, only one acre of the closure is scheduled to be replanted this year.

CONCLUSION

         Plaintiffs have established a probability of success on the merits as well as irreparable injury. In light of the government's request that the Court remand the matter to the agency rather than issue an injunction, the Court invites all parties to submit briefs on the issue of remedy. Please address what steps are required for notice and comment under Section 1.5. Simultaneous briefs (up to ten pages) should be filed no later than May 4, 2000. Simultaneous replies (up to five pages) should be filed by May 9, 2000. All service should be by hand or by fax. Because the National Park Service has declared an emergency upon the recent arrival of the bank swallows, no injunction will become effective until August upon their annual departure or until further proceedings and determination as to the validity of the emergency declaration or its scope.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 26, 2000.


FOOTNOTES:

1. Publication in the Federal Register is a procedure that allows the public to scrutinize a proposed rule. Publication is followed by a period during which the public may file written comments on the proposed rule. The comments become part of the administrative record. The purpose is to gather and record the views of all interested parties. After the comment period ends, the agency is not obligated to follow any particular comment, but the agency's decision with regard to the proposed rule many not be arbitrary and capricious in light of the administrative record, of which the comments are a part.

2. Section (a)(2)(iii) of the GGNRA compendium amendment to 36 C.F.R. I provides as follows: The following areas, described below and depicted on maps included as attachments 1-11, are designated as voice control areas where obedient pets, under supervision, may be allowed off leash. Fort Funston and Fort Funston Beach: Beach area south of Sloat Boulevard to San Mateo County line. Pets must be leashed within the trail system of the Bank Swallow Habitat Area and pets are prohibited insides the Battery Davis Hillside Closure. (A.R. US01472, GGNRA, 36 C.F.R. 1, Compendium Amend., signed on July 8, 1996, by Brian O'Neill, Gen. Superintendent).

3. "Threatened" is a less serious, listing than "endangered." The bank swallow is not federally listed as either "threatened" or "endangered."

4. "A.R. means administrative record. This abbreviation will be followed by a bates-number beginning with US, indicating that the document was produced by the government as part of the administrative record.

5. The appended map has been modified to show the approximate boundaries of the new permanent and seasonal closures. It is based on the map appended to the GGNRA compendium amendment to 36 C.F.R. 1, located in the administrative record at USO 1474.

6. As discussed in the "highly controversial" analysis, the government's argument regarding the gross size of the closure is not persuasive. The government argues that the closure encompasses less than three percent of Fort Funston and a much smaller percentage of the GGNRA. The government ignores, however, the previous closure, the relative use and distinctive features of the closed property. It is the quality of the closed land that may support plaintiffs' claim that the closure will prompt "a significant alteration in the public use pattern."


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